A Detailed Examination of Methods for Unifying, Simplifying and
  Extending Several Results About Self-Justifying Logics by Willard, Dan E.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
8.
63
30
v8
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
31
 D
ec
 20
11
A Detailed Examination of Methods for Unifying,
Simplifying and Extending Several Results About
Self-Justifying Logics
Dan E.Willard∗
State University of New York at Albany
Abstract
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1 Introduction
Let α denote an axiom system, and d denote a deduction method. The ordered pair
(α, d) will be called Self Justifying when:
i one of α ’s theorems states that the deduction method d, applied to the system α,
will produce a consistent set of theorems, and
ii the axiom system α is in fact consistent.
For any (α, d) , it is easy to construct a second axiom system αd ⊇ α that satisfies
Part-i of this definition. For instance, αd could consist of all of α ’s axioms plus the
following added sentence, that we call SelfRef(α, d) :
• There is no proof (using d’s deduction method) of 0 = 1 from the union
of the axiom system α with this sentence “SelfRef(α, d) ” (looking at itself).
Kleene [19] discussed how to encode approximate analogs of SelfRef(α, d)’s self-referential
statement. Each of Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [19, 35, 17] noted αd may, however, be
inconsistent (despite SelfRef(α, d)’s assertion), thus causing it to violate Part-ii of self-
justification’s definition.
This problem arises in settings more general than Go¨del’s paradigm, where α was
an extension of Peano Arithmetic. There are many settings where the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem does generalize [1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32,
33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 44, 46, 49, 52, 54, 56, 58, 62, 66, 63, 67]. Each such result formalizes
a paradigm where self-justification is infeasible, due to a diagonalization issue. Most
logicians have hesitated to thus employ a SelfRef(α, d) axiom because α+SelfRef(α, d) is
usually inconsistent 1.
Our research explored special circumstances [61, 64, 65, 66] where it is feasible to
construct self-justifying formalisms. These paradigms involved weakening the properties
a system can prove about addition and/or multiplication (to avoid the preceding difficul-
ties). To be more precise, let Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) denote two 3-way predicates
1 Typical ordered pairs (α, d) will have the property that the broader axiom system
αd = α+SelfRef(α, d) will be inconsistent, even when α is consistent. This is because a standard
Go¨del-like self-referencing construction will typically produce a proof of 0 = 1 from αd , irregardless of
whether or not α is consistent.
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indicating x, y and z satisfy x+ y = z and x ∗ y = z. A logic will be said to recognize
successor, addition and multiplication as Total Functions iff it includes 1-3 as axioms.
∀x ∃z Add(x, 1, z) (1)
∀x ∀y ∃z Add(x, y, z) (2)
∀x ∀y ∃z Mult(x, y, z) (3)
We will say a logic system α is Type-M iff it contains each of (1) – (3) as axioms,
Type-A iff it contains only (1) and (2) as axioms, and Type-S iff it contains only (1)
as an axiom. A system is called Type-NS iff it does not contain any of these axioms.
Our investigations [61]–[67] began by observing some Type-A systems can recognize
their consistency under semantic tableaux deduction, and several Type-NS systems can
recognize their Hilbert consistency. Many of these systems were capable of proving Peano
Arithmetic’s Π1 theorems in a language that represents addition and multiplication as
the 3-way predicates of Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z).
Our self-justifying evasions of the Incompleteness Theorem are difficult to further
extend primarily because the combined work of Pudla´k, Solovay, Nelson and Wilkie-
Paris [26, 33, 44, 58] showed natural Type-S systems cannot recognize their own Hilbert
consistency. Also, Willard [62, 67, 68] strengthened earlier results of Adamowicz-Zbierski
[1, 3] to establish that natural Type-M system cannot recognize their semantic tableaux
consistency.
A related class of evasions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem was discovered in
[68]. Let us say α is a Type-Almost-M axiom system iff α can prove statements
(4) and (5) as theorems while treating none of sentences (1) – (5) as axioms. (Many
axiom systems, that use function symbols “ + ” and “ ∗ ” for formalizing addition and
multiplication, fall technically into the Type-Almost-M category.)
∀x ∀y ∃z x+ y = z (4)
∀x ∀y ∃z x ∗ y = z (5)
The preceding is of interest because some surprisingly strong (albeit unusual) Type-
Almost-M systems [68] have an ability to verify their Herbrand but not also semantic
tableaux consistency.
The proofs in our prior papers were challenging primarily because they required one
to separate the local combinatorial methods employed in [59, 64, 66, 68]’s particular
applications from the common principles that underlied behind all these works. Our
Theorems 5.9, 5.11 and 6.6 will rectify this problem by identifying common components
that unite these four paradigms. (Theorems 6.3, 6.10, 6.12, E.1, G.2 and G.3 will then
carry on in further directions.)
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All these theorems will contain severe limits on their generality, so that the Second
Incompleteness Theorem does not contradict them. It is clearly perplexing to imagine
how humans are able to motivate themselves to cogitate, without their thought processes
possessing some type of at least tentative presumption of their own consistency. Our
research has thus consisted of an approximately equal effort in exploring both [62, 63,
66, 67]’s new generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and [59, 61, 64, 65,
66, 68]’s unusual boundary-case exceptions to it.
It is clear every boundary-case exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem has
limited scope because the Incompleteness Theorem is a broadly encompassing result.
This paper will, thus, be addressing a challenging near-paradoxical question about the
maximal nature of self-justification that can never be resolved in a fully satisfying man-
ner. The Second Incompleteness Theorem is clearly sufficiently central to logic for it
to be desirable to know what partial roads of success a self-justifying axiom system can
obtain.
2 Literature Survey
Two 5-page surveys of the prior literature about the Second Incompleteness Theorem
were provided in our articles [64, 66]. This section will present a more abbreviated survey,
focusing on only those developments that are particularly germane to the current article.
The study of incompleteness began with four classic papers by Go¨del, Lo¨b, Rosser
and Tarski [14, 25, 36, 50] and with the Hilbert-Bernays exploration of their derivability
conditions [15, 16, 18]. Generalizations of these results for weak axiom systems, such as
Q, began with the work of Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson [51] and Bezboruah-Shepherdson
[8].
Some more notation is needed to describe more recent developments. Let x′ denote
the “successor” operation that maps x onto x + 1. A formula ϕ(x) is called [15] a
Definable Cut for an axiom system α iff α can prove:
ϕ(0) AND ∀ x { ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ( x′ ) } AND ∀ x ∀ y < x { ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(y) } (6)
Definable cuts and their cousins have been studied by an extensive literature [1, 3, 6, 9,
10, 15, 18, 21, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 39, 45, 46, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58]. (They
are unrelated to Gentzen’s notion of sequent calculus deductive “cut rule”, which uses
the word “cut” in a different context).
A Definable Cut ϕ(x) is called Non-Trivial relative to an axiom system α iff
α cannot prove ∀ x ϕ(x) , although it can prove (6). Every axiom system α, strictly
weaker than Peano Arithmetic, will contain some non-trivial Definable Cut. This cut
will have the property that α can verify ϕ(n) for each fixed integer n, although it
cannot prove ∀ x ϕ(x) .
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Let ⌈Ψ ⌉ denote Ψ’s Go¨del number, and Prf dα (t, p) denote that p is a proof of the
theorem t from the axiom system α using d ’s deduction method. An axiom system
α will then be said to recognize its own Cut-Localized d-Consistency relative to a
Definable Cut ϕ iff α can prove:
∀ p { ϕ(p) ⇒ ¬ Prf dα ( ⌈0 = 1⌉ , p ) } (7)
The recent literature has sought to identify which triples (ϕ, d, α) have this property.
A crucial negative result about Cut-Localized d-Consistency, discovered by Pudla´k [33],
established a significant generalization of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. It
showed that an axiom system α must be unable to prove (7)’s statement about any of its
definable cuts ϕ , when d represents Hilbert deduction and α is any consistent extension
of Q.
Solovay [44] noted how Pudla´k’s result could be combined with the techniques of
Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [26, 58] to establish the following theorem that will often be
cited in this paper:
Theorem 2.1 (Solovay’s 1994 Generalization [44] of a 1985 theorem of Pudla´k
[33] using some of Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [26, 58]’s methods ) : Let α denote
any axiom system which contains Equation (1)’s Type-S statement and which as-
sures the successor operation always satisfies x′ 6= 0 and x′ = y′ ⇔ x = y. Then
α will be unable to recognize its own Hilbert consistency, whenever it treats addi-
tion and multiplication as 3-way relations satisfying their usual identity, associative,
commutative and distributive properties.
Solovay never published any precise proof of Theorem 2.1’s hybridizing of the work of
Pudla´k, Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [33, 26, 58], which he privately communicated [44] to
us. A reader can find generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem that are
closely related to Theorem 2.1 in papers by Pudla´k, Buss-Ignjatovic, Sˇvejdar and Willard
[10, 33, 46, 63], as well as in Appendix A of [61].
Other interesting observations that preceded our research were that Wilkie-Paris [58]
demonstrated that IΣ0 + Exp cannot prove the Hilbert consistency of even the axiom
system Q, and that Adamowicz-Zbierski [1, 3] showed that IΣ0 + Ω1 satisfied the
Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Both these results helped
stimulate [62, 67]’s semantic tableaux generalizations of the Second Incompleteness The-
orem for IΣ0.
A fascinating observation by L. A. Ko lodziejczyk [20, 21], about the difference in
lengths between semantic tableaux and Herbrandized proofs, also motivated our investi-
gation [68] into some surprising properties of unorthodox encodings for IΣ0. Ko lodziejczyk
observed [20, 21] that various generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for
IΣ0 and IΣ0 + Ωi in [1, 3, 37, 62, 67, 68] imply that the proof of the Herbrandized ver-
sion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be more complicated than its semantic
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tableaux counterpart. This is because there can be an exponential difference between
semantic tableaux and Herbrandized proof lengths under extremal circumstances. It was
due to Ko lodziejczyk’s insightful communications 2 that [68] developed an axiom sys-
tem that was a boundary-case exception to the Herbrandized but not also the semantic
tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
The literature on Definable Cuts has centered its evasions of the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem around Equation (7)’s localization formalism (rather than employing
analogs of Section 1’s SelfRef(α, d) axiom, as we did in [59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68]). Pudla´k
[33] proved that essentially every axiom system α of finite cardinality can be associated
with a definable cut ϕ such that α can prove sentence (7)’s validity for ϕ when d
is either the semantic tableaux or Herbrand-styled deductive method.
Pudla`k’s theorem is related to Friedman’s observation [13] that for many finite the-
ories S and T , the theory S has an interpretation in T if and only if IΣ0 + Exp can
prove that T ’s Herbrand consistency implies S’s Herbrand consistency. Several general-
izations of these results by Kraj´ıcek, Pudla`k, Smoryn´ski, Sˇvejdar and Visser appear in
[22, 33, 34, 39, 46, 54, 55, 56]. Visser’s article [56] contains an excellent review of this
literature, as well as many additional new results. Also, we will see how some of the reflec-
tion machines of Beklemishev, Kreisel-Takeuti and Verbrugge-Visser [5, 6, 7, 24, 52, 56]
nicely complement Theorem 6.12’s reflection mechanisms in alternate types of intended
applications.
It was established by Ha´jek, Sˇvejdar and Vopeˇnka [45, 57] that GB Set Theory can
construct a definable cut ϕ where it can prove the statement (7) is valid when d denotes
Hilbert deduction and α is ZF Set Theory. This result was surprising because Pudla´k
[33] showed GB can never verify its own Hilbert consistency localized on a definable cut.
(Thus, GB will view its Hilbert consistency as equivalent to ZF’s Hilbert consistency in
a global sense but not in a cut-localized respect.).
In some sense, Kreisel and Takeuti [24, 47] can be viewed as the first authors to
develop a logic recognizing its own consistency using a variant of Equation (6)’s formula.
Their results for typed logics formalized a second-order generalization of Gentzen’s se-
quent calculus that can verify its own consistency, when no sequent calculus deductive
cuts are performed. A key aspect of their formalism can be seen as using an analog of
(7)’s sentence in an implicit manner. It thus begins by using a set of objects, which we
shall call I, that includes all the standard integers plus some allowed non-standard
2 The Herbrandized and semantic tableaux definitions of an axiom system α’s consistency are different
from each other because the former requires skolemizing α ’s axioms, while the latter permits [12] an
existential quantifier elimination rule to replace Skolemization. This distinction can create a potential
exponential difference between the lengths of Herbrand and Semantic Tableaux proofs. This insightful
observation, due to private communications from L. A. Ko lodziejczyk [20], was used in [68] to create
an axiom system that satisfied the semantic tableaux but not also Herbrandized version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem.
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integers (that can permissibly represent contradictory proofs). Their second-order logic
then uses Dedekind’s definition of the natural numbers to construct a subset of I ,
called “ N ”, which includes all the standard integers and which is disallowed to contain
any contradiction proof. We will not go into the details here, but this transition from I
to N (with an accompanying relativization of the provability predicate onto N ’s more
restricted domain) can be viewed as Kreisel-Takeuti’s analog of (7)’s local consistency
statement for [24, 47]’s “CFA” second-order logic.
It is difficult to compare our research (which has relied upon an analog of SelfRef(α, d)’s
Kleene-like “I am consistent” axiom) with the preceding literature that has used various
forms of Localized d-Consistency statements. This is because every effort to evade the
Second Incompleteness Theorem employs some built-in weakness to evade Go¨del’s classic
paradigm.
Our work in [59, 61, 64, 65, 68] represented less than a full-scale evasion of the
Second Incompleteness Theorem mostly because it was incompatible with treating as
formal axioms the statements in Equations (3) and (5) that multiplication is a total
function 3 . Some reasons why it was helpful for [59, 61, 64, 65, 68] to employ analogs
of Section 1’s SelfRef axiom are that:
A An axiom’s self-referential “I am consistent” declaration allows a formalism to recog-
nize its consistency in a global sense, rather than in the ϕ−localized sense used by
sentence (7) and the analogous Kreisel-Takeuti relativization of their second-order
proof predicate.
B If a logic is employing a deductive method d that lacks a modus ponens rule, as
occurs in nearly all self-justifying systems, then it is preferable for it to view its “I
am consistent” statement as an axiom rather than as a theorem. (This is because
weak deductive methods are capable of drawing logical inferences only from axioms
when modus ponens is absent.)
C Analogs of Section 1’s SelfRef(α, d)’s “I am consistent” axiom have been shown by
[59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68] to at least partially formalize the notion of a logic possessing
an almost instinctive form of faith in its own internal consistency. (This paper will
make it apparent that such an instinctive faith is less than a full-scale proof. Yet,
Theorem 6.12 and Remarks 6.13, 6.14 and 6.16 will make it apparent that such
formalizations of instinctive faith are also useful.)
3This caveat applies also to our article [68], although its Herbandized form of self-justification differs
from our other papers by retaining a capacity to treat (5)’s statement about multiplication’s totality as
a derived theorem that is not an axiom. The key point is that theorems are weaker than axioms under
Herbrand deduction because only axioms are used as intermediate steps during proofs. This explains
intuitively how [68]’s formalism was able to recognize its Herbrandized consistency, while treating (5)’s
statement about the totality of multiplication as a theorem. (We will return to this subject in Appendix
D.)
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We emphasize that both virtues and drawbacks of SelfRef(α, d)’s “I am consistent” axiom
statements have been cited in this paragraph because every effort to evade the Second
Incompleteness Theorem can obtain no more than limited levels of success.
The scope of the challenge we face becomes apparent when one realizes α+SelfRef(α, d)
is inconsistent for most (α, d). This is because α+SelfRef(α, d) typically satisfies Part-
i but not also Part-ii of Section 1’s definition of a “self-justifying” logic. (Thus, a
diagonalization paradigm will typically imply α+SelfRef(α, d) is inconsistent, as a con-
sequence of it containing SelfRef(α, d) as an axiom.) This is the reason Kleene, Rogers
and Jeroslow [19, 35, 17] were hesitant about the utility of SelfRef(α, d)’s mirror-like
axiom sentence. Our goal in [59]-[68] has been to develop generalizations and boundary-
case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem, so as determine exactly which
paradigms can support, for example, Theorem 6.12’s limited notion of self-justification.
The reason one would anticipate some limited exceptions to the Second Incomplete-
ness Theorem to exist is it is hard to imagine how humans can motivate themselves to
cogitate without using some variant of self-justification.
3 Generic Configurations
The phrase Bounded Quantifier will refer to expressions of the form “∃ v ≤ T ”
or “∀ v ≤ T ” where T is a term. A formula is called Fully-Bounded when all its
quantifiers are so bounded. Lemma 3.6 will soon explain how Definition 3.1’s formalism
can encode conventional arithmetic:
Definition 3.1 Let ξ denote some non-integer indexing superscript (whose prop-
erties will be discussed later by Definition 3.4). Then the symbol ∆ξ0 will denote some
fixed special set of fully-bounded formulae that is closed under negation, in a language
that will be later called Lξ . (Thus, if some formula Ψ is a member of ∆ξ0 then so
is ¬ Ψ .) Items 1-3 formalize how Πξn and Σξn formulae are built in a straightforward
manner out of these ∆ξ0 sub-components:
1. Every ∆ξ0 formula is considered to be also a Π
ξ
0 and Σ
ξ
0 formula.
2. For n ≥ 1 , a formula will be called Πξn iff it can be written in the canonical
form of ∀v1 ∀v2 ... ∀vk Φ(v1, v2, ..vk ), where Φ is Σξn−1.
3. Likewise for n ≥ 1 , a formula will be called Σξn iff it can be written in the
form of ∃v1 ∃v2 ... ∃vk Φ(v1, v2, ..vk ), where Φ is Πξn−1.
Notation Convention: Our rules for defining ξ, specified later in this section, will
never have this superscript designate an integer quantity. This is because integer super-
scripts have a special meaning under a typed-based hierarchy, not intended here.
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Example 3.2 Let L denote a conventional arithmetic language that uses function
symbols for denoting addition and multiplication. Below are two examples of ∆0−like
formulae that invoke Definition 3.1’s notation:
a The symbol “ ∆A0 ” will denote any fully bounded formula that uses the addition,
multiplication and maximum function symbols in an arbitrary manner. (Thus, ∆A0
corresponds to what many textbooks [15, 18, 23] simply call a “ ∆0 ” formula.)
b The symbol “ ∆R0 ” will denote a class of formulae in L’s language whose bounded
quantifiers are allowed to use only the Maximum function symbol. Their bodies,
however, may contain any combination of addition, multiplication and maximum
function symbols.
Formulae (8) and (9) illustrate the distinction between the ∆A0 and ∆
R
0 classes. Thus,
(8) satisfies the first but not second condition (on account of the presence of the mul-
tiplication symbol used by its bounded quantifiers). In contrast, (9) is an example of a
∆R0 formula.
∃ y ≤ x ∗ x ∀ z ≤ y ∗ y ∃w ≤ y ∗ z : { x ∗ y = z + w } (8)
∃ y ≤ x ∀ z ≤ y ∃w ≤ Max(y, z) : { x ∗ y = z + w } (9)
The distinction between ∆A0 arithmetic formulae and the unconventional ∆
R
0 class may
first convey the impression that these two classes have fundamentally different natures.
Actually, Lemma 3.6 will show that their relationship is more subtle. This is because
its formalism will map ∆A0 formulae onto ∆
R
0 expressions that are equivalent to it under
Definition 3.3’s Standard-M model — in a context where only the length of these
formulae is allowed to possibly grow. This equivalence enabled [68] to construct a natural
axiomatic formalism that could recognize its own Herbrandized consistency but which
nevertheless satisfied the idealized form 4 of the semantic tableaux version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem.
Definition 3.3 “Standard-M” will denote the standard model of integers.
The reason for our interest in Standard-M is that many pairs of formulae are equiva-
lent under the Standard-M model, while weak axiom systems often cannot formally prove
they are equivalent. For instance, this will occur when Example 3.5 examines Definition
3.4’s properties.
4An axiom system α is defined to satisfy the “idealized form” of the semantic tableaux version
Second Incompleteness Theorem when no β ⊇ α can prove a semantic tableaux proof of 0=1 from itself
is incapable of existing. We will summarize [68]’s formalism and the distinction between Herbrandized
and semantic tableaux deduction at the of Appendix D.
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Definition 3.4 A Generic Configuration, often identified by the superscript sym-
bol of ξ , is defined to be a 5-tuple (Lξ , ∆ξ0 , B
ξ , d , G ) where:
1. Lξ is a language that includes logical symbols for “0”, “1”, “2”, “=”, “≤” and for
the operation of “Maximum(x,y)”. Lξ also includes a sufficient number of function
and constant symbols so that every integer k can be encoded by some term Tk
specifying k ’s value.
2. ∆ξ0 corresponds to any variation of Definition 3.1’s class of “fully-bounded” for-
mulae that is rich enough to assure that there exists two ∆ξ0 formulae, henceforth
called “Add(x, y, z)” and “Mult(x, y, z)”, for formalizing the graphs of addition
and multiplication. (It will generate ξ’s set of Πξn and Σ
ξ
n sentences, using Defini-
tion 3.1’s 3-part formalism.)
3. Bξ denotes a “Base Axiom System”, whose axiom-sentences are true under
the Standard-M model and which is Σξ1 complete. (Thus, B
ξ can prove every true
Σξ1 sentence, and it can likewise refute all false Π
ξ
1 sentences.)
4. d denotes ξ ’s method of deduction. It is required to be sufficiently conven-
tional to satisfy the usual indirect-implication property 5 associated with Go¨del’s
Completeness Theorem.
5. g denotes a method for encoding the Go¨del numbers of proofs.
Example 3.5 Let us recall Example 3.2 defined “ ∆A0 ” as essentially the conven-
tional textbook notion [15, 23] of an arithmetic “ ∆0 ” formula. This example will outline
how well-known techniques can map every ∆A0 formula onto a semantically equivalent
∆ξ0 formula under the Standard-M model.
Our discussion will have Seq(x) denote a function that maps non-negative integers
onto binary strings in lexicographic order. Thus Seq(x) maps 0 onto the empty string,
the integers 1 and 2 onto the strings of “0” and “1”, the integers 3–6 onto “00”, “01”,
“10”, “11”, etc. (Formally, Seq(x) is an operation that maps integer x onto the bit-
string that occurs to the immediate right of the leftmost “1” bit in the binary encoding
of x+ 1. )
Given any k−tuple ( x1 , x2 , ... xk ), let STRING(x1, x2, ... xk) denote the con-
catenation of Seq(x1), ... Seq(xk). For any integers v and w satisfying v ≤ w2, it is clear
that there exists (x1, x2, x3) where STRING(x1, x2, x3) represents v’s binary encoding
and each xi ≤ Max(w, 4).
5 This is that irregardless of whether or not d contains a built-in modus ponens rule, it does
support some form of a (possibly quite lengthy) proof of a theorem Z, when it is able to prove X, Y and
(X ∧ Y ) → Z as theorems.
9
An example will now illustrate the approximate structure of an inductive method-
ology for mapping ∆A0 formulae onto their equivalent ∆
ξ
0 counterparts in the Standard-M
model. Let SQUARE(x1, x2, x3, w) be a ∆
ξ
0 formula which specifies that STRING(x1, x2, x3)
represents an integer ≤ w2 . Also, let φ∗(x1, x2, x3) and φ(v) represent a pair of ∆ξ0 and
∆A0 formulae that are equivalent under the Standard-M model when STRING(x1, x2, x3)
is an encoding for v . Then one possible method for mapping ∆A0 formulae onto their
equivalent ∆ξ0 counterparts (in the Standard-M model) could map the formula (10) onto
(11)’s alternate form:
∀ v ≤ w2 φ(v) (10)
∀ x1 ≤ Max(w, 2) ∀ x2 ≤ Max(w, 2) ∀ x3 ≤ Max(w, 2)
{ SQUARE(x1, x2, x3, w) ⇒ φ∗(x1, x2, x3) } (11)
Lemma 3.6 indicates Example 3.5’s translational methodology generalizes easily to all
combinations of ∆A0 inputs and generic configurations ξ , via an approximate inductive
generalization of the transition from sentence (10) to (11). (Its procedure essentially
performs iteratively a finite number of such transitions, so as to translate all the clauses
of an initial ∆A0 formulae into their ∆
ξ
0 counterparts via an inductive methodology. The
intuition behind these transitions is they will repeatedly replace a single variable, such
as v in sentence (10), with a multiplicity of variables, such as (x1, x2, x3) in (11).)
Lemma 3.6 (Paris-Dimitracopoulos [28] ) For every generic configuration ξ, each
∆A0 formula can be translated into an equivalent ∆
ξ
0 formula in the Standard-M model
via a generalization of Example 3.5’s process. (This clearly implies ΠAj formulae can also
be translated into Πξj expressions.)
Paris-Dimitracopoulos [28] sketched an analog of Lemma 3.6’s translation algorithm,
using only slightly different notation, that is applicable to any formalism that satisfies
Parts (1) and (2) of Definition 3.4. Their formalism thus uses an inductively-iterated
analog of the prior example’s replacement of a single variable v in formula (10) with
(11)’s multiplicity of variables (x1, x2, x3) , so as to perform Lemma 3.6’s translation
task. It will be unnecessary for a reader to consider the details behind [28]’s Theorem
1 or Lemma 3.6’s similar translation mechanism because the remainder of this article
will never use them again. Instead, their sole purpose has been to provide an implicit
backdrop for our results by illustrating how the study of the Πξ1 sentences of Definition
3.4’s generic configurations provides information about ΠA1 sentences (after the needed
translating is done).
Four examples of self-justifying systems that employ Definition 3.4’s Πξ1 sentences
will be illustrated in Appendix D . These examples are too complicated to be examined
before Sections 3 – 6 are read. However, the next example should convey some useful
intuitions:
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Example 3.7 Let x0, x1, x2, ... and y0, y1, y2, ... denote sequences defined by:
x0 = 2 = y0 (12)
xi = xi−1 + xi−1 (13)
yi = yi−1 ∗ yi−1 (14)
For i > 0 , let φi and ψi denote the sentences in (13) and (14) respectively. Also, let φ0
and ψ0 denote (12)’s sentence. Then φ0, φ1, ... φn imply xn = 2
n+1 , and ψ0, ψ1, ... ψn
imply yn = 2
2n . Thus, the latter sequence grows at a faster rate than the former.
Much of our research has used the difference between the growth rates of x0, x1, x2, ...
and y0, y1, y2, ... as a motivating example explaining why Equation (2)’s Type-A axiom
systems can support a stronger form of boundary-case exception to the semantic tableaux
version of the Second Incompleteness theorem than can Type-M systems.
Let Log( yn ) = 2
n and Log(xn ) = n+ 1 thus designate the lengths of the binary
codings for yn and xn . Then yn ’s coding has a length 2
n , which is much larger
than the n + 1 steps that ψ0, ψ1, ... ψn use to define its existence. However, xn ’s
length has a smaller size of n+ 1 . These observations are useful because every proof
of the Incompleteness Theorem involves a Go¨del number z coding a sentence that has
a capacity to self-reference its own definition. The faster growing series y0, y1, , ... yn
should be intuitively anticipated to have this self-referencing capacity because yn ’s
binary encoding has a 2n+1 length that dwarfs the size of the O(n) steps used to define
its value. Leaving aside [62, 67]’s many details, this fast growth explains roughly why
many Type-M logics satisfy the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem.
This paradigm also illustrates intuitively why some Type-A systems, employing
[59, 61, 64]’s semantic tableaux formalism, can represent boundary-case exceptions to
the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This is because such formalisms lack access to
Equation (3)’s axiom that multiplication is a total function. (They are unable, thus,
to easily construct numbers z that can self-reference their own definitions because they
have access only to the slower growing addition primitive.) In particular assuming only
that each sentence in the axiom-sequence φ0, φ1, ...φn (from Equation (13) ) requires a
mere two bits for its encoding, the length n+ 1 of xn’s binary encoding will be smaller
than the length of its defining sequence.
This short length for xn had motivated [59, 61, 64, 65]’s evasion of the semantic
tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. It suggested that the self-
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referencing needed in a Go¨del-like diagonalization argument would stop being feasible
when Equation (13)’s slow-growing x1, x2, x3, ... sequence represents the fastest growth
that is possible.
One of the several goals in this article will be to formalize a generalizations of [59,
61, 64, 65]’s self-justifying methodologies by using Definition 3.4’s generic configurations.
The proofs of our main theorems will, of course, be more subtle than the hand-waving
intuitions appearing in this example. For instance, the combined work of Pudla´k, Solovay,
Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [26, 33, 44, 58] (summarized by Theorem 2.1) raised the subtle
issue that no Type-S system can prove a theorem affirming its own Hilbert consistency.
Another complication is that the Equation (14)’s implication for proofs that use the
multiplication operative has different side effects for Herbrandized and semantic tableaux
deduction (on account of Ko lodziejczyk [20, 21]’s previously mentioned observations
about the potential exponential difference between the lengths of these proofs under
extremal circumstances).
Our main theorems will show that self-justifying systems, using four deduction meth-
ods, are capable of proving all of Peano Arithmetic’s Πξ1 theorems. Interestingly, self-
justification will be compatible with [64]’s modification of semantic tableaux deduction,
that includes a modus ponens rule for Πξ1 and Σ
ξ
1 type sentences. However, [63] has shown
an analogous modus ponens rule for Πξ2 and Σ
ξ
2 sentences is incompatible with self jus-
tification. (Thus, the contrast between our main results and the Second Incompleteness
Theorem’s generalizations will be quite tight.)
4 Five Helpful Definitions and An Informative Lemma
This section will introduce five definitions and prove a Lemma 4.6 about self justification.
This lemma will be weaker than Sections 5 and 6’s main results. Its main purpose will
be to provide a useful starting example.
Definition 4.1 The symbol “E(n)” will denote some term in Definition 3.4’s lan-
guage Lξ that represents the value 2n . In using this symbol, we do not presume that Lξ
possesses a function symbol for the exponent operation. Thus if Lξ has only a function
symbol for multiplication, then E(n) could designate the term of “ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ ... ∗ 2 ” with
n repetitions of “2” . (Alternatively, E(n) can be defined via applying 2n iterations of
the successor function to zero, or by having a special constant symbol designating 2n ’s
value. Essentially, any reasonable method can be used to define E(n)’s value)
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Definition 4.2 Let Υ denote a prenex normal sentence. Then ScopeE(Υ,N) will
denote a sentence identical to Υ except that every unbounded universal quantifier
“ ∀ v ” is changed to “∀ v < E(N) ”, and every unbounded existential quantifier “∃ v ”
is changed to “∃ v < E(N) ”. (No change is made among the bounded quantifiers
within the ∆ξ0 part of the sentence Υ .) For example, if Υ denotes the Π
ξ
1 sentence
of ∀ v1 ∀ v2 ... ∀ vk φ(v1, v2, ...vk) then (15) illustrates ScopeE(Υ,N)’s form. Likewise
if Υ is the Σξ1 sentence of ∃ v1 ∃ v2 ... ∃ vk φ(v1, v2, ...vk) then (16) illustrates
ScopeE(Υ,N)’s form.
∀ v1 < E(N) ∀ v2 < E(N) ...∀ vk < E(N) : φ(v1, v2, ...vk) (15)
∃ v1 < E(N) ∃ v2 < E(N) ...∃ vk < E(N) : φ(v1, v2, ...vk) (16)
Special Note about Definition 4.2’s Meaning. If Υ is a ∆ξ0 sentence then
ScopeE(Υ, N) will be equivalent to Υ for every N ≥ 0 by definition. (This is because
∆ξ0 formulae contain no unbounded quantifiers that undergo change when Υ is mapped
onto ScopeE(Υ, N). )
More About this Notation: The potentially lengthy syntactic object of “ ScopeE(Υ,N) ”
will actually not be used in our physical encodings of proofs. Instead, these encodings
will use the more desirably compressed object of “Υ ” (which has no possibly bulky E(N)
term). The sole function of ScopeE(Υ,N) will be for us to speculate about what Boolean
value Υ would theoretically assume (under the Standard-M model) if Υ ’s quantifiers
were modified so that their ranges were changed to be bounded by E(N). (It turns out
that ScopeE(Υ,N) ’s finitized quantifier-range will help simplify our analysis.)
Definition 4.3 A Πξ1 or Σ
ξ
1 sentence Υ will be called Good(N) when the entity
ScopeE(Υ, N) is true under the Standard-M model
6. Also, a set of Πξ1 sentences, denoted
as θ, is called Good(N) iff all of its sentences are Good(N).
Definition 4.4 If Υ is a Πξ1 sentence then ♯( Υ ) will denote the largest integer J
such that Υ satisfies the Good(J) condition. (It will equal ∞ if Υ satisfies Good(J) for
all J .) Also, if θ is a set of Πξ1 sentences, then ♯( θ ) will denote the largest J where each
sentence in θ is Good(J).
A Very Helpful Start : Several more definitions will be needed before Section 6
can present our strongest results. The remainder of this section will illustrate how the
current formalism is already sufficient for introducing a useful starting lemma.
6 A quite unusual aspect of Definition 4.3 is that its Good(N) condition has opposite properties when
it is applied to Πξ1 and Σ
ξ
1 sentences in one particular respect. This is because for each N, the Good( N )
condition is weaker than the Good( ∞ ) condition for Πξ1 sentences, while it is stronger than it for Σξ1
sentences. (For instance, ∀ x φ(x) is stronger than ∀ x < E(N) φ(x) , but ∃x φ(x) is weaker than
∃ x < E(N) φ(x) .)
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Definition 4.5 Let (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G) again denote a generic configuration called
ξ , and let us presume that its base axiom system Bξ is comprised exclusively of Πξ1
sentences. Also, let β ⊃ Bξ denote a second axiom system, comprised also of Πξ1
sentences, that (unlike Bξ ) can possibly be inconsistent. (If β is inconsistent then let
qβ denote the shortest proof of 0 = 1 from β . ) Then the generic configuration ξ
will be called Tight if iff every inconsistent set of Πξ1 sentences β ⊃ Bξ satisfies the
following constraint:
Log( qβ ) ≥ ♯( β ) + 2 (17)
Lemma 4.6 will prove Bξ+SelfRef(Bξ, d) satisfies Section 1’s self-justification criteria
whenever ξ is tight. This “tightness” will clearly fail to be satisfied by many generic
configurations. This is because the Second Incompleteness Theorem is a widely encom-
passing result, which imposes severe restrictions on its allowed exceptions. Lemma 4.6’s
mini-result will be of interest primarily because it will be generalized substantially in
Sections 5 and 6.
Lemma 4.6 If a generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G) is tight then Bξ+SelfRef(Bξ, d)
will be a consistent self-justifying axiom system.
Proof Sketch: Our justification of Lemma 4.6’s mini-result will be simpler than the
next section’s proof of Theorem 5.9’s stronger result. The current proof will also be kept
brief and informal because the same topic will be visited more rigorously during Section
5’s discourse.
Let Ψ denote Section 1’s SelfRef(Bξ, d) sentence. We will omit formalizing Ψ ’s
exact Πξ1 encoding here because Appendix A will provide a more general fixed-point
construction, using Definition 5.7’s stronger paradigm. The current proof will simply
presume Ψ ’s fixed point statement can receive a Πξ1 encoding under sentence (18),
where “ PrfdBξ+SelfRef(Bξ ,d)( ⌈ 0 = 1 ⌉ , p ) ” is a ∆ξ0 formula, indicating that p is a
proof of 0=1 from Bξ + SelfRef(Bξ, d) under d ’s deduction method.
∀ p ¬ PrfdBξ+SelfRef(Bξ ,d)( ⌈ 0 = 1 ⌉ , p ) (18)
The Definition 4.4’s symbol ♯ will be helpful at this juncture. The application
of ξ’s tightness to (18)’s Πξ1 styled encoding will imply
7 that (19) must be true when
Ψ is false under the Standard-M model and when the shortest proof of 0 = 1 from
Bξ + SelfRef(Bξ, d) is denoted as q.
Log( q ) = ♯( Ψ ) + 1 (19)
7Equation (19) is easy to justify when one presumes there is an available Πξ1 encoding of (18)’s
statement, which we call Ψ . (This Πξ1 presumption is reasonable because an analog of Ψ ’s exact Π
ξ
1
encoding will be discussed later by Definition 5.7 and in Appendix A.) The invalidity of Ψ will thus
assure the existence of a proof of 0 = 1 from Bξ +SelfRef(Bξ , d). Moreover, Definition 4.4’s notation
implies ♯( Ψ ) will equal Log(q) − 1 when q denotes the shortest proof of 0 = 1 from Bξ+SelfRef(Bξ, d).
The latter shows (19) is valid.
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Also Definition 4.4 trivially implies ♯( Bξ+Ψ ) = ♯( Ψ ) (because all of Bξ ’s axioms
are true under the Standard-M model). Thus, (19) yields (20).
Log( q ) = ♯( Bξ +Ψ ) + 1 (20)
But the point is that the Tightness constraint’s Equation (17), used in the context where
β is the axiom system of Bξ + Ψ , implies Log( q ) ≥ ♯( Bξ + Ψ ) + 2 . This
directly contradicts Equation (20)’s equality, whenever the proof “ q ” of 0 = 1 cited
in our discussion does formally exist. This contradiction is precisely what is needed to
corroborate Lemma 4.6’s claim that the axiom system Bξ + SelfRef(Bξ, d) must be
consistent. (Thus, Bξ + SelfRef(Bξ, d) must be consistent because otherwise a proof
q of 0 = 1 would exist and have its Log( q ) ≥ ♯( Bξ+Ψ ) + 2 inequality contradict
Equation (20).) ✷
How Lemma 4.6 May Be Interpreted : We remind the reader that many (but
not all) generic configurations will fail to satisfy Lemma 4.6’s tightness hypothesis. This
is because any configuration satisfying this hypothesis represents one of those unusual
boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem that are feasible.
Lemma 4.6 was intended to capture the simplest variant of a self-justifying phenom-
ena (that employs Definition 4.4’s machinery). Its proof was kept informal because more
sophisticated self-justifying formalisms will be explored in Sections 5 and 6. They will
apply to four different types of generic configurations, each of whose base axiom systems
Bξ can be made capable of proving all Peano Arithmetic’s Πξ1 theorems — in a context
where these systems use a broader variant of “I am consistent” axiom-statement than
does Lemma 4.6’s “SelfRef(Bξ , d)” sentence.
5 The First Two Meta-Theorems about Self-Justification
The core theorems in this section will employ the following notation:
1. The symbol θ will denote any recursively enumerable (r.e.) set of Πξ1 sentences,
henceforth called a R-View. (An R-View does not need to be valid under the
Standard-M model. It only needs to be r.e.)
2. RE-Class(ξ) shall denote the set of all possible “R-Views” θ that can be built out
of ξ ’s language Lξ . (This permits both valid and invalid R-Views to appear in
RE-Class(ξ). We choose this unrestricted definition because no recursive decision
procedure can identify all the true Πξ1 sentences in the Standard-M model.)
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Definition 5.1 Let ξ denote the 5-tuple (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G) representing one of Def-
inition 3.4’s generic configurations, and let RE-Class(ξ) and its R-Views “θ” be defined
as in the previous paragraph. Then ξ is called A-Stable iff each θ ∈RE-Class(ξ)
satisfies the following invariant:
* If Υ is a Πξ1 theorem of axiom system θ∪Bξ via a proof p whose length satisfies
Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 then Υ will satisfy Good{ 12 ♯( θ) } .
Remark 5.2 The invariant ∗ states short proofs (with lengths ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 ) will
produce at least partially useful deductions, in that their Πξ1 theorems will always satisfy
Good{ 12 ♯( θ) } , irregardless of whether or not θ’s axioms are technically true. (This
makes the study of A-stability very interesting unto itself, apart from its applications in
the current article).
Theorem 5.11 will show the presence of A-stability, alone, is sufficient for constructing
self-justifying systems. This will imply every A-stable configuration must contain some
embedded weakness (as every evasion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem always
does). On the other hand, Appendix F will explain how A-stability and its “EA-stable”
cousin (defined later) are both epistemologically interesting. Thus, A-stability has re-
deeming features.
Definition 5.3 A Generic Configuration ξ will be called E-Stable iff all of the
θ ∈RE-Class(ξ) satisfy ∗ ∗ . (This construct is the counterpart for Σξ1 sentences of
the Item ∗ in Definition 5.1.)
** If Υ is a Σξ1 theorem derived from the axiom system θ ∪ Bξ via a proof p
whose length satisfies Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 then Υ will automatically satisfy
Good{ 12 ⌊ Log(p) ⌋ − 1 } . (This invariant further implies 8 that Υ will also
satisfy the Good{ 12 ♯( θ) } criteria.)
Remark 5.4 The invariants ∗ and ∗∗ are partially analogous to each other because
both imply that if p is a proof short enough to satisfy Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 then
their resulting theorem will satisfy Good{ 12 ♯( θ) } . However, there is a distinction
between Definitions 5.1 and 5.3, as well. This is because the prior section’s Footnote
6 observed that Σξ1 sentences are stronger when they meet a Good(N ) rather than a
Good(∞ ) threshold, while the reverse is true for Πξ1 sentences. Thus ∗∗ ’s short proofs
p (satisfying Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 ) will have the special property that their theorems
Υ will satisfy a “Good{ 12 ⌊ Log(p) ⌋ − 1 } ” constraint that is actually stronger than
their formal Σξ1 statements.
8This point is easy to confirm when one remembers that Σξ1 sentences Υ have the property
that A < B implies ScopeE(Υ, A) is stronger than ScopeE(Υ, B). It is then obvious that the
Good{ 1
2
⌊ Log(p) ⌋ − 1 } criteria implies the validity of Good{ 1
2
♯( θ) } for Σξ1 sentences
because the invariant ∗∗ presumes its Σξ1 theorems have proofs p satisfying “ Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 ”.
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The Appendix D will provide four examples of generic configurations that are either
E-stable or A-stable (or often both). Its most prominent example will be a configuration
ξ∗ that uses semantic tableaux deduction and recognizes addition as a total function.
Theorem D.4 will imply such systems can be made self-justifying and able to prove Peano
Arithmetic’s Π∗1 theorems.
Three more definitions are needed to help introduce our first theorem
Definition 5.5 A generic configuration ξ will be called EA-stable iff it is both
E-stable and A-stable. (It will thus satisfy both ∗ and ∗ ∗ .)
Our next definition is related to the fact that many definitions of consistency are
logically equivalent from the perspective of strong enough logics, but they are often not
provably equivalent from the perspectives of weak logics.
Definition 5.6 Let ξ denote the generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G), and α be
an axiom system satisfying α ⊇ Bξ. Then α is called Level(kξ) Consistent when there
exists no proofs from α via d’s deduction method of both a Πξk sentence and of the Σ
ξ
k
sentence that is its negation
Most of this article will focus on self-justifying systems that recognize their Level(kξ)
consistency when k equals 0 or 1. Our next definition will be applied mostly to these
two cases.
Definition 5.7 Given any k ≥ 0, a generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, Bξ, d,G) and an
axiom system β ⊃ Bξ, the symbol SelfConsk(β, d) will denote a self-referencing Πξ1
sentence declaring β+SelfConsk(β, d)’s formal Level(kξ) consistency, as is illustrated
below by the statement + . (An encoding for SelfConsk(β, d) will be provided by
Appendix A.)
+ There exists no two proofs (using deduction method d) of both some
Πξk sentence and of the Σ
ξ
k sentence, that represents its negation, from the
union of the axiom system β with this added sentence “SelfConsk(β, d) ”
(looking at itself).
Remark 5.8 We will focus on Definition 5.7’s SelfConsk(β, d) axiom mostly in the
settings where k = 0 or 1. This is because SelfConsk(β, d) will typically be too strong
for it to generate boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem when
k ≥ 2 . It turns out that even when k = 1 , Definition 5.7’s SelfConsk(β, d) state-
ment will be significantly stronger than the axiomatic declaration • used by Section 1’s
SelfRef(β, d) axiom. This is because SelfCons1(β, d) asserts non-existence of simultane-
ous proofs for a Πξ1 sentence and its negation, while SelfRef(β, d) establishes merely
the non-existence of a proof of 0 = 1.
17
Theorem 5.9 Let ξ denote a generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G) that is EA-
stable. Then the corresponding axiom system of Bξ+SelfCons1(Bξ, d) must satisfy Sec-
tion 1’s definition of self-justification.
Proof. The justification of Theorem 5.9 will be a more elaborate version of Lemma
4.6’s mini-proof. It will replace Definition 4.5’s Tightness constraint with an EA-stability
requirement. It will also replace SelfRef(β, d)’s “I am consistent” axiom with a stronger
SelfCons1(β, d) statement.
Our proof will focus on showing Bξ+SelfCons1(Bξ, d) is consistent (and thus satisfies
the subtle Part-ii component of Section 1’s definition of “Self-Justification”). It will be
awkward during our discussion to write repeatedly the expression “Bξ+SelfCons1(Bξ, d) ”.
Therefore, “S” will be the abbreviated name for this axiom system. We will also employ
the following notation:
1. PrfS(t, p) will denote that p is a proof of the theorem t from the above
mentioned formalism “ S ” (using ξ ’s deduction method of d ).
2. Neg1(x, y) will denote that x is the Go¨del encoding of a Πξ1 sentence and that
y is a Σξ1 sentence which represents x ’s formal negation.
Appendix A explains how to combine the theory of LinH functions [15, 23, 69] with
[61]’s fixed point methods to provide PrfS(t, p) and Neg
1(x, y) with ∆ξ0 encodings. (A
reader can omit examining Appendix A, if he just accepts this fact.) Thus, (21) can be
viewed 9 in this context as being SelfCons1(Bξ, d) ’s formalized Πξ1 statement, declaring
the Level(1ξ) consistency of S:
∀x∀ y ∀ p ∀ q ¬ {Neg1(x, y) ∧ PrfS (x, p) ∧ PrfS (y, q) } (21)
Let Φ denote (21)’s sentence. We will use it to prove Theorem 5.9’s claim that S is
consistent. Our proof will be a proof by contradiction. It will begin with the assumption
that S is inconsistent. This implies Φ is false under the Standard-M model. Hence,
Definition 4.4 implies
♯( Φ ) < ∞ (22)
Equation (22) thus indicates there exists (p¯, q¯, x¯, y¯) satisfying (23) (because such a tuple
will be a counter-example to (21)’s assertion). The particular (p, q, x, y) satisfying (23)
9Our notation convention has the abbreviated formula of “ PrfS(t, p) ” in Equation (21) corresponding
to Appendix A’s “ SubstPrf dβ (n¯, t, p) ” formula, in a context where n specifies the Go¨del number of
the expression Γk(g) in Appendix A’s Equation (36) and where the superscript k within this formula
“ Γk(g) ” is set equal to 1. This implies that sentence (21) does assert the Level(1ξ) consistency of S.
——————————————————-
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with minimum value for Log{Max[p, q, x, y] } can then be easily shown 10 to also satisfy
Equation (24).
Neg1( x¯ , y¯ ) ∧ PrfS ( x¯ , p¯ ) ∧ PrfS ( y¯ , q¯ ) (23)
Log { Max[ p¯ , q¯ , x¯ , y¯ ] } = ♯( Φ ) + 1 (24)
We will now use (23) and (24) to bring our proof-by-contradiction to its conclusion.
Let Υ denote the Πξ1 sentence specified by x¯ . Then ¬Υ will correspond to the Σξ1
sentence denoted by y¯ . Also, (23) and (24) imply that both Υ and ¬Υ have proofs
such that the logarithms of their Go¨del numbers are bounded by ♯( Φ ) + 1 . These
facts imply that Υ and ¬Υ both satisfy Good{ 12 ♯( Φ) } under our formalism.
(This is because if we take θ in Definitions 5.1 and 5.3 to be simply Φ ’s 1-sentence
statement, then the invariants of ∗ and ∗∗ from these two definitions both impose the
same Good{ 12 ♯( Φ) } constraint on Υ and ¬Υ .)
It is infeasible, however, for a sentence and its negation to both satisfy the same
goodness constraint. This completes Theorem 5.9’s proof-by-contradiction because the
initial assumption that S was inconsistent has led to an infeasible conclusion. ✷
Our next definition will help formalize a useful cousin of Theorem 5.9.
Definition 5.10 A Generic Configuration of ξ will be called 0-Stable when every
particular θ ∈ RE-Class(ξ) satisfies the invariant of ∗ ∗ ∗. (This invariant is strictly
weaker than its counterparts ∗ and ∗∗ in Definitions 5.1 and 5.3.)
*** If Υ is a ∆ξ0 theorem derived from the axiom system θ ∪ Bξ via a proof p
whose length satisfies Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) +1 , then Υ is true under the Standard-M
model.
Theorem 5.11 If the configuration ξ is 0-stable then Bξ+SelfCons0(Bξ, d) is a self-
justifying formalism. (Appendix C shows this result applies also to E-stable and A-stable
configurations.)
Theorem 5.11’s proof is similar to Theorem 5.9’s proof. The difference between these
two propositions is that Theorem 5.11 has reduced SelfCons’s superscript from 1 to 0,
so that its hypothesis can encompass a theoretically broader set of applications. (The
Appendix C summarizes how Theorem 5.9’s proof can be easily modified to also prove
Theorem 5.11.)
10 Let L denote the minimum value for Log{ Max[p, q, x, y] } for a tuple (p, q, x, y) satisfying Equa-
tion (23). Then by definition, Φ satisfies Good(L − 1) but not Good(L). From Definition 4.4, this
establishes the validity of Equation (24) (because the minimal (p¯, q¯, x¯, y¯) satisfying sentence (23) has
Log{Max[p¯, q¯, x¯, y¯]} = L. )
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Remark 5.12 Theorems 5.9 and 5.11 should clarify the nature of [59]–[68]’s for-
malisms. This is because proofs-by-contradictions are notorious in the mathematical
literature for being confusing. They should be simplified whenever possible. This has
been done mainly through Theorem 5.9’s short proof. (It applies to three of Appendix
D’s four examples of generic configurations, and Theorem 5.11 applies to Appendix D’s
fourth example.) Furthermore, Section 6 will show how more elaborate self-justification
systems can verify all Peano Arithmetic’s Πξ1 theorems.
6 Four Further Meta-Theorems
We need one preliminary lemma before exploring how strong self-viewing logics may
become before they cross the inevitable boundary between self-justification and incon-
sistency, implied by Go¨del’s Theorem.
Lemma 6.1 Let ξ denote a generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G) , and θ• denote
an r.e. set of Πξ1 sentences, each of which holds true in the Standard-M model. Let ξ
•
denote a 5-tuple that differs from ξ in that its base axiom system is Bξ ∪ θ• (rather than
Bξ). These conditions imply that ξ• is a generic configuration, and it will satisfy the
following four invariants:
i If ξ is 0-stable then ξ• will also be 0-stable .
ii If ξ is A-stable then ξ• will also be A-stable .
iii If ξ is E-stable then ξ• will also be E-stable .
iv If ξ is EA-stable then ξ• will also be EA-stable .
Lemma 6.1’s proof is fairly straightforward. It has been placed in the Appendix B.
This section will use Lemma 6.1 to prove four meta-theorems that are consequences of
its formalism.
Definition 6.2 Let ξ again denote a generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G), and
θ denote some r.e. set of Πξ1 sentences (which are not required to be true under the
Standard-M model). For the cases where k is either 0 or 1, the symbol Gξk( θ ) will
denote the following axiom system:
Gξk( θ ) = θ ∪ Bξ ∪ SelfConsk{ [ θ ∪ Bξ ] , d } (25)
Also when k = 0 or 1, the function Gξk (which maps θ onto G
ξ
k( θ ) ) is called Con-
sistency Preserving iff Gξk( θ ) is assured to be consistent whenever all the sentences
in θ are true under the Standard-M model.
We emphasize consistency preservation is unusual in logic. This is because Gξk( θ )
comes from adding a self-justifying axiom to an initially consistent formalism Bξ+θ , and
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the Second Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates that sufficiently powerful formalisms
are simply incompatible with such an axiom. However, there will be four specialized
paradigms, defined in Appendix D, that are exceptions to this rule. They will be related
to our next result:
Theorem 6.3 The function Gξ1 shall satisfy Definition 6.2’s consistency preser-
vation property when ξ is EA-stable. Likewise the function Gξ0 will be consistency
preserving when ξ is any one of A-stable, E-stable or 0-stable. (Thus in each case,
Gξk( θ ) will be consistent when all the sentences in θ are true in the Standard-M
model.)
Proof. It will be convenient for our proof to use a dot-style notation, analogous to
Lemma 6.1’s terminology. Thus,
1. θ• denotes any r.e. set of Πξ1 sentences that are each true under the Standard-M
model.
2. ξ• is the tuple (Lξ , ∆ξ0 , B
ξ ∪ θ• , d , G ). (It differs from ξ by replacing ξ ’s base
axiom system of Bξ with Bξ ∪ θ•.)
Part-iv of Lemma 6.1 indicates the EA-stability of ξ implies the EA-stability of ξ•. More-
over Theorem 5.9 applies to all EA-stable configurations, including ξ•. Thus, Gξ1( θ
• ) is
consistent because ξ is EA-stable and all of θ• ’s sentences are true in the Standard-M
model. This proves Theorem 6.3’s first claim.
An almost identical proof, where Theorem 5.11 simply replaces Theorem 5.9 as the
central self-justifying engine, will corroborate Theorem 6.3’s second claim . Thus, Gξ0
is consistency preserving when ξ is one of A-stable, E-stable or 0-stable. ✷
Remark 6.4 Most generic configurations ξ will not satisfy Theorem 6.3’s hypoth-
esis because Gξk(θ) will typically be inconsistent, irregardless
11 of whether or not all
of θ ’s axioms are valid under the Standard-M model. The significance of Theorem 6.3
is that it shows that some outlying exceptions to this general rule do prevail when ξ
satisfies one of Theorem 6.3’s four stability conditions. These exceptions are related to
the 3-page abbreviated philosophical discussion that will appear later in Appendix F.
They will assure that Theorem 6.3’s formalisms of Gξ1(θ) and G
ξ
0(θ) are always consistent
whenever θ ’s axioms are valid in the Standard-M model.
Our next definition will enable self-justifying formalisms to prove the Πξ1 theorems
of any consistent r.e. axiom system that uses Lξ ’s language.
Definition 6.5 Let ξ denote a generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G). Let B denote
any recursive axiom system whose language is an extension of Lξ . For an arbitrary
11Conventional generic configurations ξ will satisfy the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions [16, 15].
Their Gξk(θ) will thus be automatically inconsistent because of a Go¨del-like diagonalization argument.
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deduction method D (which may be possibly different from ξ ’s deduction method d ),
let PrfDB ( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , q ) denote a ∆ξ0 formula indicating q is a proof of the theorem Ψ from
axiom system B , using deduction method D . Then the Group-2 Schema for (B,D)
is defined as an infinite set of axioms that includes one instance of (26)’s axiom for each
Πξ1 sentence Ψ.
∀ q { PrfDB ( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , q ) −→ Ψ } (26)
Comment about this Notation: The Definition 6.5 had called (26) a “Group-2
Schema” so as to keep our terminology consistent with [59, 61, 64, 66]’s notation.
Theorem 6.6 Let ξ denote any arbitrary generic configuration, and (B,D) denote
any pair consisting of an axiom system and a deduction method (which, once again, are
allowed to be different from ξ ’s deduction method and axiom system). Then if all of
(B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems are true in the Standard-M model, the following two invariants will
hold:
i If ξ is EA-stable then there will exist an r.e. self-justifying system that can prove
all of (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems and recognize its own Level( 1ξ ) consistency.
ii Likewise, if ξ is one of A-stable, E-stable or 0-stable, there will exist an r.e. self-
justifying system that can confirm all of (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems and which can rec-
ognize its own Level( 0ξ ) consistency.
Proof. Theorem 6.6 follows from Theorem 6.3. Thus let θ denote the set of all
Πξ1 sentences that are members of Definition 6.5’s Group-2 schema. Then every one of
θ ’s Group-2 axioms must be true under the Standard-M model (because the hypothesis
of Theorem 6.6 indicated all of (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems are true in this model). Hence,
Theorem 6.3 implies:
1. Gξ1( θ ) is consistent when ξ is EA-stable.
2. Gξ0( θ ) is consistent when ξ is one of A-stable, E-stable or 0-stable.
Since Gξ0( θ ) and G
ξ
1( θ ) are self-justifying systems that prove all of (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems,
Items 1 and 2 will substantiate Theorem 6.6’s two claims. ✷
An awkward aspect of Definition 6.5’s “Group-2” schema is that it employs an infinite
number of instances of (26)’s Group-2-like axiom sentences. It turns out that this Group-
2 scheme can be compressed into a single axiom sentence, if one is willing to settle for a
slightly diluted variant of (B,D)’s Πξ1 knowledge. To formalize this concept, the following
notation shall be used:
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1. Checkξ(t) will denote a ∆ξ0 formula that checks to see whether t represents the
Go¨del number of a Πξ1 sentence.
2. Testξ(t, x) will denote any ∆ξ0 formula where (27)’s invariant is true under the
Standard-M model for every Πξ1 sentence Ψ simultaneously. There are infinitely
many different ∆ξ0 formulae that can serve as Test
ξ(t, x) predicates satisfying this
condition. (Example 6.7 will illustrate one such encoding of a Testξ(t, x) predicate.)
Ψ ←→ ∀ x Testξ( ⌈ Ψ ⌉ , x ) (27)
The expression (28) will be called a Global Simulation Sentence for representing
(B,D) via ξ . Its Testξ(t, x) clause essentially allows ξ to simulate the Πξ1 knowledge of
(B,D)’s set of theorems.
∀ t ∀ q ∀ x { [ PrfDB (t, q) ∧ Checkξ(t) ] −→ Testξ(t, x) } (28)
Example 6.7 For any generic configuration ξ = (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G), let NegPrfξ(t, x)
denote a ∆ξ0 formula specifying that t is a Π
ξ
1 sentence and that x is a proof under d ’s
deduction method of the Σξ1 sentence that represents t ’s negation. Also, let Test
ξ
0(t, x)
be defined as follow:
Testξ0(t, x) =def ¬ NegPrfξ(t, x) (29)
For each Πξ1 sentence Ψ, it is easy to verify
12 that the statement (30) is true under the
Standard-M model.
Ψ ←→ ∀ x Testξ0( ⌈ Ψ ⌉ , x ) (30)
The latter implies that (31) is a global simulation sentence for (B,D).
∀ t ∀ q ∀ x { [ PrfDB (t, q) ∧ Checkξ(t) ] −→ Testξ0(t, x) } (31)
We emphasize that there are countably infinite different examples of Testξi (t, x) predi-
cates that generate global simulation sentences and that statement (31) illustrates only
one such example.
Definition 6.8 Let (B,D) denote any ordered pair whose set of Πξ1 theorems are
true under the Standard-M model. Let Testξ1 , Test
ξ
2 , Test
ξ
3 .... denote the set of
∆ξ0 formulae where statement (27) is true under the Standard-M model for every Π
ξ
1
sentences Ψ. Then TestListξ will denote a list of all these Testξi predicates. Also for
each Testξj formula in TestList
ξ , the symbol GlobSimD
B
(ξ, j) will denote the special
version of (28)’s global simulation formalism that employs Testξj ’s machinery.
12Part-3 of Definition 3.4 indicated that ξ ’s base axiom system is “ Σξ1 complete”. (It is thus able
to prove all Σξ1 sentences that are true in the true in Standard-M model, and it will likewise refute all
Πξ1 sentences that are false.) The statement (29) then immediately implies that (30) must be true under
the Standard-M model for every Πξ1 sentence Ψ .
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Remark 6.9 A comparison between Definition 6.5’s Group-2 schema with 6.8’s
global simulation sentences will reveal neither is strictly better than the other. Both
have their own separate advantages. Thus, the attractive aspect about Definition 6.8’s
GlobSimD
B
(ξ, j) sentence is that it is a finite-sized object that can simulate the infinite
set of axioms associated with Definition 6.5’s Group-2 schema. The accompanying draw-
back 13 of a global simulation sentence is that the union of it with the base-axiom system
Bξ will typically be inadequate to prove every Πξ1 sentence that is a theorem of (B,D).
Instead, in a context where Ψ is a Πξ1 theorem of (B,D), the sentence GlobSimDB (ξ, j)
will usually provide only enough fragmented information to prove the statement (32)
(which is equivalent to Ψ under the Standard-M model).
∀ x Testξj( ⌈ Ψ ⌉ , x ) (32)
While (32) may be insufficient to prove Ψ from Bξ , it still (according to the statement
(27) ) has the desired property of being equivalent to Ψ under the Standard-M model.
(This means that the knowledge of (32)’s truth is helpful, even if it is unknown from
Bξ ’s perspective to be equivalent to Ψ . )
Our prior articles [59, 61, 64, 66] did not use Definition 6.8’s global simulation formal-
ism. They employed, instead, Definition 6.5’s Group-2 axiom schema. Theorem 6.10 will
be the analog of Theorem 6.6 for global simulation. It will be useful when one desires to
compress all the information held by a Group-2 schema into a single finite-sized object.
Theorem 6.10 Let ξ denote the generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G), B denote
a recursively enumerable axiom system and D denote any deduction method (which can
be different than ξ ’s deduction method d ) . Suppose that all the Πξ1 theorems generated
by (B , D ) are true under the Standard-M model. Then the following invariants do hold:
i If ξ is EA-stable then for each j there exists a finitized extension βj of
Bξ that recognizes its Level(1ξ) self-consistency and which contains the sentence
GlobSimD
B
(ξ, j).
ii Likewise for each j, if ξ is E-stable, A-stable or 0-stable then there exists a fini-
tized extension βj of B
ξ that recognizes its Level(0ξ) self-consistency and which
contains the sentence GlobSimD
B
(ξ, j).
Proof: Let θ denote the 1-sentence R-View of “GlobSimD
B
(ξ, j)” formalized by
Definition 6.8, and let β1j and β
0
j denote B
ξ ∪ θ+SelfCons1(Bξ ∪ θ ) and
13The chief difficulty arises essentially because a Πξ1 theorem of (B,D) may contain an arbitrarily long
combination of bounded universal and bounded existential quantifiers. Thus, some generic configurations
will have base axiom systems Bξ that are so weak that their combination with (28)’s Global Simulation
Sentence is insufficient to prove the validity of (27)’s equivalence statement for all Πξ1 sentences Ψ
simultaneously. In particular, such proofs will often be infeasible when Ψ ’s sequence of bounded quantifies
has a length greatly exceeding the length of the Go¨del encoding for (28)’s global simulation statement.
24
Bξ ∪ θ+SelfCons0(Bξ ∪ θ ) , respectively. These axiom systems correspond to the
objects that Definition 6.2 had called Gξ1(θ) and G
ξ
0(θ).
Theorem 6.10’s hypothesis indicates all the Πξ1 theorems of (B,D) are true under the
Standard-M model. Thus, it follows that θ is also true in the Standard-M model. Hence
Theorem 6.3 implies that β1j = G
ξ
1(θ) is a consistent system satisfying Theorem 6.10’s
claim (i). Likewise, Theorem 6.3 implies β0j = G
ξ
0(θ) satisfies Theorem 6.10’s second
claim. ✷
Remark 6.11 Theorems 6.6 and 6.10 raise a fascinating question: Is the trade-off
between these formalisms needed? That is, can self-justifying systems use only a a finite
number of added axioms beyond those lying in ξ ’s base system of Bξ and also duplicate
all (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems in a pure sense (i.e. without simulation) ? We will return to
this topic in Appendix G.
REFLECTION PARADIGMS : Our last goal is to show how self-justifying
systems support unusually strong reflection principles. Let Reflectα,d( Ψ ) denote (33)’s
statement when Ψ is a sentence with Go¨del number ⌈Ψ ⌉ , and (α, d) denotes an
axiom system and deduction method.
∀ p [ Prfα,d( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , p ) ⇒ Ψ ] (33)
Lo¨b’s Theorem [15, 25, 42] implies that conventional systems (α, d) , possessing at least
Peano Arithmetic’s strength, are unable to prove Reflectα,d( Ψ ) except for in the
degenerate cases where they can prove Ψ.
Moreover, it is easy to generalize Lo¨b’s Theorem (via say [61]’s Theorem 7.2) so that
a wide class of formalisms α , weaker than Peano Arithmetic, are also unable to prove
Reflectα,d( Ψ ) for all Π
ξ
1 sentences Ψ simultaneously.
The intuition behind this generalization is quite simple. Let ✵ denote a Πξ1 encoding
for the classic Go¨del sentence declaring: “ There is no proof of me from the axiom
system α using d ’s deduction method”. Then [61]’s Theorem 7.2 uses a very routine
diagonalization argument to show most formalisms α will be inconsistent if they prove
Reflectα,d( ✵ )’s statement.
Our next theorem will show, surprisingly, that the preceding limitation is much less
stringent than it may initially appear to be. This is because Level( 1ξ ) self-justifying
axiom systems are capable of proving very close analogs to (33)’s impermissible
25
reflection principle, using a “translational” methodology.
Thus, let T denote an algorithm that maps a Πξ1 sentence Ψ onto a “translated”
sentence ΨT that is equivalent to Ψ under the Standard-M model and which is also
written in a Πξ1 format. (See footnote
14 for why it is absolutely imperative that both
these requirements be included in T ’s definition.) Also, let ReflectTα,d( Ψ ) denote the
translational modification of (33)’s reflection principle that replaces Ψ with ΨT .
∀ p [ Prfα,d( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , p ) ⇒ ΨT ] (34)
Theorem 6.12 Let ξ denote the EA-stable configuration of (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G), and
let α = Bξ+ SelfCons1(Bξ ) denote ξ ’s corresponding Level(1) self-justifying axiom
system. Then there will exist a translation methodology T where α can prove the
validity of (34) for all its Πξ1 sentences simultaneously.
Proof: Let us use Example 6.7’s notation. It observed that Ψ ’s Πξ1 statement was
equivalent under the Standard-M model to “∀x Testξ0( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , x )”. Thus, let us view T
as being a mapping of the first sentence onto the second.
Our proof of Theorem 6.12 will next use the following observations:
1. The non-existence of a proof of ¬ Ψ from Bξ+SelfCons1(Bξ ) trivially implies
the non-existence of a proof of the same theorem from Bξ (because the latter
axiom system is simply a subset of the former).
2. Moreover, Example 6.7’s notation treats “∀x Testξ0( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , x )” as being equivalent
to the declaration that no proof of ¬ Ψ from Bξ exists.
Hence, α can prove (34)’s statement by noting that p ’s proof of a Πξ1 sentence Ψ
implies (via α ’s SelfCons1 axiom) the non-existence of a proof of ¬ Ψ , which (via
Items 1 and 2) implies “∀x Testξ0( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , x )” ✷.
Remark 6.13 : Theorem 6.12 and the statement (34)’s Translational Reflection
Principle may possibly be useful devices in unraveling some of the mystery that has
enshrouded Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem, since its inception. This is partly
because Go¨del was explicitly uncertain about the generality of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem in his initial 1931 seminal paper [14] about this subject. His centennial paper
about Incompleteness thus included the following quite poignant caveat:
14 Part-3 of Definition 3.4 indicated that generic configurations are Σξ1 complete. Our requirement
that ΨT must have a Πξ1 format thus causes T to gain much added meaning. This is because the
axiom system Bξ will then automatically disprove ΨT whenever it is false under the Standard-M
model. (Thus, T ’s mapping of Ψ onto ΨT gains much significance when Ψ and ΨT do rest on the
same Πξ1 level of the arithmetic hierarchy.)
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• : “It must be expressly noted that Theorem XI (i.e the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem) represents no contradiction of the formalistic standpoint
of Hilbert. For this standpoint presupposes only the existence of a consis-
tency proof by finite means, and there might conceivably be finite proofs which
cannot be stated in ... ”
Some of the issues that troubled Go¨del in the statement • can perhaps be partially
resolved if one compares the reflection principles of sentences (33) and (34). This is
because (33) is probably unnecessary to explain how thinking beings can appreciate
their Πξ1 theorems when Theorem 6.12’s specialized logics can, instead, use the fact
that its Πξ1 sentences satisfy at least (34)’s modified reflection principle. Thus, some
of the mystery surrounding the Second Incompleteness Effect can be clarified when one
notices that (34)’s translational reflection princible is a useful precept, that was shown
by Theorem 6.12 to be technically unrelated to Go¨del’s observation that no reasonable
formalism can prove (33)’s purist principle for all Πξ1 sentences simultaneously.
Remark 6.14 Theorem 6.12 is also significant because it explains how its specialized
logics can grapple with a Πξ1 encoded Go¨del sentence ✵ which asserts “There is no
proof of me”. This issue is challenging because routine constructions, such as [61]’s
Theorem 7.2, demonstrate that no natural logic can verify statement (33)’s validity for
all Πξ1 sentences Ψ (on account of the well-known syllogism posed by ✵’s Go¨del
sentence). Theorem 6.12 constructs, however, a reply to this challenge. This is because
its self-justifying systems do surprisingly prove, without difficulty 15, the validity of (34)’s
translated modification of (33)’s unobtainable Πξ1 styled variant of a reflection principle.
Remark 6.15 We encourage the reader to examine the work of Beklemishev, Kreisel-
Takeuti and Verbrugge-Visser [5, 6, 7, 24, 52, 56] to see alternative reflection principles
and their uses. (The constraint on proof-length, by Verbrugge-Visser, is certainly one
alternative to Theorem 6.12’s machinery. Likewise, Kreisel-Takeuti’s Second Order Logic
CFA reflection is another alternative, although it will not 16 generalize to first-order log-
ics.) One complicating aspect of our Theorem 6.12’s reflection method is that Appendix
E proves it becomes inoperable when an axiom system is sufficiently conventional to sat-
isfy Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. In essence, Theorem 6.12’s translational
15Since Ψ and ΨT are equivalent under the Standard-M Model but not also equivalent from the
perspective of the system α = Bξ +SelfCons1(Bξ ), the conventional contradictions, produced by
(33)’s reflection principle, disappear when it is replaced by (34). (Thus, there is no danger that α could
use (34)’s reflection principle to prove an analog of ✵ ’s forbidden Go¨del sentence.)
——————————————————-
16Kreisel-Takeuti indicate on page 25 of [24] that CFA’s reflection principle for a first order formula
“A” infers the validity of only the relativized formula “ AN ” from A’s proof. Also, their proof predicate
is similarily relativized. Thus CFA’s second-order logic reflection principle, while fascinating, does not
generalize to first-order logic environments.
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reflection principle is a specialized methodology, intended for logics using Definition 5.7’s
Level(1) style of self-justification.
Remark 6.16 The preceding discussion clearly shows self-justifying logics are tempt-
ing. At the same time, it is necessary to be very cautious because there are also two
fundamental barriers limiting such results:
a The first is the Theorem 2.1 arising from the joint work of Pudla´k, Solovay, Nel-
son and Wilkie-Paris [26, 33, 44, 58]. It showed no reasonable system recognizing
successor as a total function can verify its own Hilbert consistency. Also, Willard
[62, 67] established analogous results under semantic tableaux consistency for sys-
tems recognizing multiplication as a total function. Thus, each effort to evade the
Second Incompleteness Theorem must encounter robust barriers.
b A second issue is that Definition 5.7’s “SelfCons” “I am consistent” axiom sentence is
less than ideal because it causes axiom systems to produce essentially a 1-line proof
of their own consistency. Such an excessively compressed proof corresponds more
closely to an axiom system formulating an instinctive faith in its own consistency
(rather than it supporting a full-length proof-justification of this fact).
Part of the reason self-justifying systems are of interest, despite these limitations, is that
they illustrate how some formalisms are compatible with at least an instinctive faith in
their own self-consistency. (This compatibility issue is non-trivial because Item (a) im-
plies there are many circumstances where a generalization of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem will make it infeasible for a formalism to satisfy both Parts (i) and (ii) of Sec-
tion 1’s definition of Self-Justification.) Moreover, three of Appendix D’s four sample
self-justifying configurations, called ξ∗ , ξ∗∗ and ξR , will be Type-A systems that rec-
ognize addition as a total function. These configurations will thus possess the following
three significant finitized features:
1. They will be able to construct the entire infinite set of integers by finite means
because they recognize addition as a total function.
2. For any r.e. logical configuration (B,D), it will be possible to develop a 1-sentence
finitized extension for the base axiom systems of any of the configurations of ξ∗ ,
ξ∗∗ and ξR , which deploy (28)’s Global Simulation Sentence to simulate the
Πξ1 knowledge of (B,D). This means that some fully finite-sized extensions of the
base-formalisms of ξ∗ , ξ∗∗ and ξR will contain a non-trivial amount of Πξ1
styled knowledge, since (B,D) can correspond to, say, Peano Arithmetic.
3. The key point is that a 1-sentence extension of an axiom system containing features
(1) and (2) can formalize how a logic can possess an instinctive faith in its own
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consistency via Theorem 6.10’s explicitly finitized structure. (Moreover, Theorem
6.12’s Translational Reflection Principle is applicable to Appendix D’s generic con-
figurations of ξ∗ and ξ∗∗ . It will thus imply that their single finitized Level-1
self-justifying axioms enable them to prove an infinite number of incarnations of
(34)’s translational reflection principle, where each Π∗1 sentence Ψ is mapped onto
one such unique instance.)
The contrast between Items 1-3’s positive remarks about “finitized” cogitation with
Items (a) and (b)’s opposing comments is obviously formidable. It is clearly preferable
to view these positive results cautiously and treat them as being no more than boundary-
case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem. The essential reason why these
exceptions are of interest is that Go¨del’s famous centennial paper has implicitly raised
the following puzzling issue:
# How is it that Human Beings manage to muster the physical drive to
think (and prove theorems) when the many generalizations of Go¨del’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem assert conventional logics lack knowledge of their
own consistency?
There will, of course, never be any perfect answer to the puzzle posed by # because
philosophical paradoxes and ironical dilemmas never yield perfect answers. However,
part of an imperfect answer to # is that Items 1-3 reply to Challenges (a) and (b) by
formalizing how a thinking being can muster an approximate partial instinctive faith in its
own self-consistency. (Moreover, the tight contrast between various generalizations of the
Second Incompleteness Theorem [1, 3, 8, 10, 15, 16, 21, 25, 33, 37, 44, 46, 58, 62, 63, 67]
with the self-justifying systems appearing in Appendixes D and G suggests that these
come close to being maximal forms of feasible results.)
Our remaining discussion will consist of four optional sections, called Appendixes D,
E, F and G, which can be skimmed, omitted or examined in any order the reader prefers.
A summary of their contents is given below:
I The Appendix D provides four examples of generic configurations that utilize The-
orems 5.9, 5.11, 6.3, 6.6 and 6.10. Its most prominent examples involve Equa-
tion (2)’s Type-A axiom systems where the deduction method is either semantic
tableaux or a modified version of tableaux that permits a modus ponens rule for
Πξ1 and Σ
ξ
1 sentences.
II The Appendix E introduces a generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
which shows that Theorem 6.12’s Translational Reflection Principle applies only to
self-justifying logics. (It is thus fully inoperative for conventional logics. This may
explain why Theorem 6.12’s self-justifying systems are an interesting topic.)
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III The Appendix F differs from the rest of this paper by having a philosophical slant.
It will offer a 3-page summary about why we suspect Theorem 6.3’s self-justification
formalism and Remark 6.16’s notion of “instinctive faith” are useful.
IV The Appendix G introduces a “Bracedξ(Φ, j)” construct and two new theorems
that hybridize the methodologies of Theorems 6.6 and 6.10. These results will
improve upon Theorem 6.6 because their self-justifying systems contain only a
finite number of axiom-sentences beyond those lying in ξ ’s base formalism of
Bξ. They will improve upon Theorem 6.10 because they can prove the important
Bracedξ(Φ, j) subset of (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems in a full sense (rather than in Re-
mark 6.9’s weaker simulated respect). Appendix G’s results are useful because for
arbitrary k and for any of Appendix D’s four sample configurations, every Πξ1 the-
orem of (B,D) containing k or fewer bounded and unbounded quantifiers will be
proven by its Theorem G.3 to be self-justifying in an undiluted pure sense. (This
is because each such Πξ1 sentence, with fewer than k quantifiers, will lie in some
fixed Bracedξ(Φ, j) set — where solely the value of k determines the values for
Φ and j . )
It is probably desirable to concentrate primarily on Theorems 5.9, 5.11, 6.3, 6.6, 6.10
and 6.12 during one’s first reading of this paper. This is because Appendixes A-G are
less central than these core theorems, although their material does add several useful
further perspectives to this subject.
7. Concluding Remarks
The research in this article has been a continuation of our prior research [59]-[68] that
simultaneously has simplified, unified and extended the prior results. It has explored
self-justification with a 3-part approach where:
1. Sections 4 and 5 introduced three different stem components that can be used to
generate self-justifying systems. (These are the relatively simple Lemma 4.6 and
the mathematically more sophisticated Theorems 5.9 and 5.11.)
2. Section 6 and Appendix G then generalized our initial stem-like theorems in the
six different directions formalized by Theorem 6.3, 6.6, 6.10, 6.12, G.2 and G.3
3. Appendix D subsequently provided four examples of generic configurations that
are applications of Section 6’s results.
This 3-part approach is very different from the methods used in our prior articles [59, 64,
66, 68]. The latter examined particular isolated applications in thorough detail (rather
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than compartmentalize and separate the analysis into three stages). The virtue of this
3-stage analysis is it leads to many new theorems, in addition to unifying our prior
results.
It is desirable to categorize the maximal generality and strongest form of boundary-
case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem that are feasible because Go¨del’s
centennial discovery beckons the scholarly community to sharpen their understanding of
his 1931 landmark discovery, that has fundamentally reshaped mathematics.
It should be emphasized that our over-all research in [59] – [68] has spent an approx-
imately equal effort in exploring generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
[62, 63, 66, 67] and in examining its viable boundary-case exceptions [59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68]
(although the current article focused on the latter topic). This is because the Second
Incompleteness Theorem is a starkly robust result that imposes sharp limits on how
strong self-justifying systems may become.
Finally, we encourage the reader to take another brief glance at Remarks 6.13 – 6.16.
They offer a brief summary of both the strengths and limitations of our chief results.
They also explain how Theorem 6.12’s reflection principle for Πξ1 styled theorems is a
very unexpected result.
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Appendix A: The Πξ1 encoding for SelfCons
k(β, d)
This appendix will summarize how to formalize a Πξ1 encoding for Definition 5.7’s
SelfConsk(β, d) predicate. It will use the following notation:
1. Negk(x, y), will denote a ∆ξ0 formula indicating that x is the Go¨del number of a
Πξk sentence and that y represents the Σ
ξ
k sentence which is its logical negation.
2. Prf dβ ( t , p ) will denote a formula designating that p is a proof of theorem t
from the axiom system β using the deduction method d.
3. ExPrf dβ (h , t , p ) will denote that p is a proof (using d’s deduction method) of a
theorem t from the union of the axiom system β with the added sentence whose
Go¨del number equals h .
4. Subst ( g , h ) will denote Go¨del’s substitution formula — which yields TRUE when
g is an encoding of a formula and h encodes a sentence that replaces all occurrence
of free variables in g with a term of g¯ (that specifies g’s Go¨del number).
5. SubstPrf dβ ( g , t , p ) will denote the hybridization of Items 3 and 4 that yields a
Boolean value of TRUE when there exists an integer h satisfying Subst ( g , h )
and ExPrf dβ (h , t , p ).
It is easy to apply [61]’s methodologies to confirm Items 1-5 can be encoded as
∆ξ0 formulae. Thus, Appendixes C and D of [61] explained how the theory of LinH
functions [15, 23, 69] implied there existed ∆0 encodings for formulae 1-4, and these
∆0 encodings can be easily rewritten
17 as ∆ξ0 expressions. Equation (35) uses this
information to formulate a ∆ξ0 encoding for SubstPrf
d
β (g, t, p)’s graph. It is equivalent
to “ ∃ h { Subst(g, h) ∧ ExPrf dβ(h, t, p) } ”, but Equation (35) is written in a ∆ξ0
format — unlike the quoted expression.
Prf dβ ( t , p ) ∨ ∃ h ≤ p { Subst ( g , h ) ∧ ExPrf dβ (h , t , p ) } (35)
Using (35)’s ∆ξ0 encoding for SubstPrf
d
β(g, t, p), it is easy to encode SelfCons
k(β, d)
as a Πξ1 axiom-sentence. Thus, let Γ
k(g) denote (36)’s formula, and let n¯ denote Γ(g)’s
Go¨del number.
∀x∀ y ∀ p ∀ q ¬ {Negk(x, y) ∧ SubstPrf dβ (g, x, p) ∧ SubstPrf dβ (g, y, q) } (36)
Then “ Γk( n¯ ) ” is a Πξ1 encoding for SelfCons
k(β, d)’s formalization of the statement
+ from Definition 5.7. Thus, Γk( n¯ ) is encoded is as follows:
∀x∀ y ∀ p ∀ q ¬ {Negk(x, y) ∧ SubstPrf dβ (n¯, x, p) ∧ SubstPrf dβ (n¯, y, q) } (37)
17This rewriting of conventional ∆0 formulae into a ∆
ξ
0 format is possible because Part 2 of Defini-
tion 3.4 indicated that two 3-way predicates of Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) do encode addition and
multiplication in a ∆ξ0 styled form.
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Reminder about Equation (37) : This sentence’s definition for SelfConsk(β, d)
does not assure (37) is true under the Standard-M model. Indeed for nearly all (β, d),
it will be false when k ≥ 2. This is the reason that the study of SelfConsk(β, d), under
Theorems 5.9 and 5.11, has focused on the cases where k equals 0 or 1. Moreover, the
preceding construction did assure that SelfConsk(β, d) had a Πξ1 encoding because such
an “I am consistent” axiom carries more meaning than a Πξ2 encoded axiom.
Appendix B: The Proof of Lemma 6.1
Lemma 6.1 is a crucial interim step used to verify each of Theorems 6.3, 6.6 and 6.10.
Its proof will employ the following three straightforward observations:
Fact B.1 Lemma 6.1’s hypothesis implies that ξ• is a generic configuration. (This is
because it specified that ξ was a generic configuration and that all the Πξ1 sentences
of θ• were true in the Standard-M model. Thus, ξ• must also be a generic
configuration.)
Fact B.2 The associative identity of θ ∪ (θ• ∪Bξ) = ( θ ∪ θ• )∪Bξ obviously holds.
It implies a sentence Υ is a theorem of θ ∪ (θ• ∪Bξ) if and only if it is a theorem
of ( θ ∪ θ• ) ∪Bξ .
Fact B.3 Lemma 6.1’s hypothesis directly 18 implies ♯( θ) = ♯( θ• ∪ θ).
The justification of claims (i)-(iv) are consequences of Facts B.1 through B.3. We
will provide a detailed proof of only Claim (i) here because all four claims have similar
proofs.
Proof of Claim (i) : The hypothesis of Claim (i) indicated that ξ was 0-stable.
Therefore, it satisfies Definition 5.10’s invariant of ∗ ∗ ∗ . In a context where φ is a
variable designating a r.e. set of Πξ1 sentences and Υ is a variable corresponding to a
∆ξ0 sentence, the invariant ∗ ∗ ∗ can be rewritten in a quasi-rigorous form as :
∀ φ ∀ Υ the below statement, called Ψ1(φ,Υ), is true (38)
∀ p If Υ is a ∆ξ0 theorem derived from the axiom system φ ∪ Bξ via a
proof p , whose length satisfies Log(p) ≤ ♯( φ ) + 1 , then Υ is true under
the Standard-M model.
Since (38)’s universally quantified variable φ can designate any r.e. set of Πξ1 sentences,
it may designate the object “ θ ∪ θ• ”, where θ• is the r.e. set of Πξ1 sentences defined
18The identity of ♯( θ• ) = ∞ must be true because the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1 indicated
that all the Πξ1 sentences in θ
• are true under the Standard-M model. By Definition 4.4, this implies
♯( θ ) = ♯( θ• ∪ θ ) .
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by Lemma 6.1’s hypothesis (and θ is any second r.e. set of sentences). Thus, (38)
directly implies :
∀ θ ∀Υ the below statement, called Ψ2(θ,Υ), is true (39)
∀ p If Υ is a ∆ξ0 theorem derived from the axiom system ( θ ∪ θ• ) ∪Bξ
via a proof p , whose length satisfies Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ ∪ θ•) + 1, then Υ is
true under Standard-M.
Facts B.2 and B.3 enable one to simplify (39)’s terms of ( θ ∪ θ• ) ∪Bξ and ♯( ( θ ∪ θ• ) )
and thus to derive (40) as a consequence.
∀ θ ∀Υ the below statement, called Ψ3(θ,Υ), is true (40)
∀ p If Υ is a ∆ξ0 theorem derived from axiom system θ ∪ ( θ• ∪Bξ ) via
a proof p, whose length satisfies Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1, then Υ is true under
the Standard-M model.
We will now use Fact B.1’s observation that ξ• is a generic configuration. The sentence
(40) indicates this configuration satisfies Definition 5.10’s invariant of ∗ ∗ ∗. Hence, ξ• is
0-stable. ✷
Brief Comments about the Justifications of Claims (ii)-(iv): This appendix
has omitted proving (ii)-(iv) for the sake of brevity. Their proofs are similar to Claim
(i)’s proof. For instance, Claim (ii)’s proof differs from Claim (i)’s proof by having the
0-stability invariant in ∗ ∗ ∗ replaced by the A-stability invariant of ∗ . This will cause
the analogs of (38) – (40) to undergo the following two simple changes under Claim (ii)’s
proof :
1. Υ will represent a Πξ1 (rather than a ∆
ξ
0 ) theorem-statement under the revised
versions of Ψ1, Ψ2 and Ψ3 used in Claim (ii)’s proof
2. The requirement (in sentences (38)-(40) of Claim i’s proof) that Υ be true in the
Standard model is changed to the stipulation that Υ satisfies the Good{ 12 ♯( φ) }
and Good{ 12 ♯( θ)} conditions under the revised forms of Ψ1, Ψ2 and Ψ3 used to
prove Claim (ii).
Other minor adjustments in Claim (i)’s proof shall verify Claims iii and iv.
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Appendix C: The Proof of Theorem 5.11
Our proof of Theorem 5.11 is a straightforward modification of Theorem 5.9’s proof. It
will be divided into two lemmas.
Lemma C.1. Every generic configuration that is either E-stable or A-stable will
automatically satisfy Definition 5.10’s 0-stability condition.
Proof. Lemma C.1 is a consequence of the “Special Note” appearing at the end
of Definition 4.2. For every N ≥ 0, it indicated that if Υ is a ∆ξ0 sentence then
ScopeE(Υ, N) is equivalent to Υ . This implies (via Definition 4.3) that if Υ is a
Good(N) ∆ξ0 formula then ScopeE(Υ, N) is automatically true under the Standard-M
model.
The latter observation makes it easy to confirm Lemma C.1. This is because every
∆ξ0 sentence is a Π
ξ
1 and Σ
ξ
1 statement. Hence, the application of the invariants ∗
and ∗ ∗ from Definitions 5.1 and 5.3, in the degenerate case where Υ is a ∆ξ0 theorem,
corroborates Lemma C.1’s claim (by showing that Definition 5.10’s invariant of ∗ ∗ ∗
does hold). ✷
The remainder of this appendix will focus on Definition 5.10’s 0-stability condition.
(This is sufficient to justify Theorem 5.11 because Lemma C.1 showed all E-stable and
A-stable configurations are 0-stable.)
Lemma C.2. Let ξ denote a generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G) that is 0-
Stable. Then the axiom system of Bξ+SelfCons0(Bξ, d) will be consistent (and hence
self-justifying).
Proof: It will be awkward to write repeatedly the expression “Bξ+SelfCons0(Bξ, d) ”
during our proof. Therefore, H will be an abbreviated name for this system. Our justi-
fication of Lemma C.2, is similar to Theorem 5.9’s proof, except it replaces a Level(1ξ)
form of self-justification with a Level(0ξ). It will thus be abbreviated and use the fol-
lowing notation:
1. PrfH(t, p) is a ∆
ξ
0 formula specifying p is a proof of the theorem t from the
axiom system H (using ξ ’s deduction method of d ).
2. Neg0(x, y) is a ∆ξ0 formula indicating x is the Go¨del encoding of a ∆
ξ
0 sentence
and y is a ∆ξ0 sentence representing x ’s negation.
Expression (41) denotes H ’s Level(0ξ) self-justification axiom. It is encoded using
Appendix A’s methodology, similar to its counterpart used in Theorem 5.9’s proof (i.e.
Equation (21) ).
∀x∀ y ∀ p ∀ q ¬ {Neg0(x, y) ∧ PrfH (x, p) ∧ PrfH (y, q) } (41)
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Our proof of Lemma C.2 will be a proof by contradiction. It will thus begin with the
contrary assumption that H is inconsistent and have Φ denote (41)’s sentence. The
inconsistency of H implies that Φ is false under the Standard-M model. Hence via
Definition 4.4, we get:
♯( Φ ) < ∞ (42)
Equation (42) implies there exists a tuple (p¯, q¯, x¯, y¯) satisfying (43). (This is because such
a (p¯, q¯, x¯, y¯) corroborates (42)’s implication that a counter-example to (41)’s sentence
does exist.)
Neg0( x¯ , y¯ ) ∧ PrfH ( x¯ , p¯ ) ∧ PrfH ( y¯ , q¯ ) (43)
The (p, q, x, y) satisfying (43) with minimum value for Log{Max[p, q, x, y] } will addition-
ally satisfy (44). (This observation follows from the analog of the Footnote 10 appearing
in Theorem 5.9’s proof. Thus, Section 5’s Equations of (23) and (24) are the analogs of
the current Equations (43) and (44). The Footnote 10 showed the particular (p, q, x, y)
satisfying (23) with minimum value for Log{ Max[p, q, x, y] } satisfied (24). By the same
reasoning, the minimal (p¯, q¯, x¯, y¯) satisfying (43) will satisfy (44).)
Log { Max[ p¯ , q¯ , x¯ , y¯ ] } = ♯( Φ ) + 1 (44)
Equations (43) and (44) shall bring Lemma C.2’s proof-by-contradiction to its sought-
after end. Thus, let Υ denote the ∆ξ0 sentence specified by x¯ . Then ¬ Υ corresponds
to the ∆ξ0 sentence denoted by y¯ . Equation (44) indicates that both Υ and ¬ Υ have
proofs such that the logarithms of their Go¨del numbers are bounded by ♯( Φ ) + 1 .
Using Definition 5.10’s invariant of ∗ ∗ ∗ , these facts establish 19 that both Υ and
¬ Υ are true under the Standard-M model.
But it is impossible for a sentence and its negation to be both true. This finishes
Lemma C.2’s proof because the temporary assumption that H was inconsistent has led
to a contradiction. ✷
Theorem 5.11 is a consequence of the Lemmas C.1 and C.2 because Lemma C.2’s for-
malism generalizes to all E-stable and A-stable configurations via Lemma C.1’s reduction
methodology.
19To apply Definition 5.10’s invariant ∗ ∗ ∗ in the present setting, one simply sets θ ’s R-View equal
to Φ ’s 1-sentence statement. Then ∗ ∗ ∗ implies that both Υ and ¬ Υ must be true under the
Standard-M model because both their proofs had lengths ≤ ♯( Φ ) + 1 .
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Appendix D: Applications and Examples
This appendix will illustrate four examples of generic configurations that satisfy Theo-
rems 5.9 and 5.11 (and which therefore are self-justifying). It will be divided into three
parts. Section D-1 will define our first example of self-justifying configuration, called ξ∗ .
It will use semantic tableaux deduction. Section D-2 will prove that ξ∗ is EA-stable.
Section D-3 will briefly sketch three additional examples of stable generic configurations
It is likely preferable to examine Sections 3 – 6 before this appendix. However, Section
D-1’s short 2-page discussion can be read quite easily either before or after Section 6.
D-1. Definition of the EA-Stable Configuration ξ∗
Our first example of an EA-Stable configuration, called ξ∗ , will be defined in this section.
Its deduction method will be semantic tableaux. Its base axiom system B∗ will be a
Type-A formalism, which treats addition but not multiplication as a total function (i.e.
see Equation (2) ).
The closest analog of B∗ and ξ∗ in our prior work appeared in Section 5 of [64]. (It
differed from ξ∗ partly because it did not use Definition 3.4’s unifying notation.) In [64],
a function F was called Non-Growth iff F (a1, a2, ...aj) ≤ Maximum(a1, a2, ...aj) for
all a1, a2, ...aj . Six examples of non-growth functions are:
1. Integer Subtraction where “ x−y ” is defined to equal zero in the special case where
x ≤ y,
2. Integer Division where “ x÷ y ” equals x when y = 0, and it equals ⌊ x/y ⌋
otherwise,
3. Root(x, y) which equals ⌈ x1/y ⌉ when y ≥ 1, and it equals x when y = 0.
4. Maximum(x, y),
5. Logarithm(x) = ⌊ Log2(x) ⌋ when x ≥ 2, and zero otherwise.
6. Count(x, j) = the number of “1” bits among x’s rightmost j bits.
These operations were called Grounding Functions in [64]. The term U-Grounding
Function referred to a set of functions that included the Grounding operations plus the
further primitives of addition and Double(x) = x+ x. (The Double operation is helpful
because it significantly enhances [64]’s linguistic efficiency 20 .)
The symbol ∆∗0 will be the analog of Definition 3.1’s ∆
ξ
0 construct under the U-
Grounding function language. (It will be defined to be any formula in a U-Grounding
20The symbol Double(x) was technically unnecessary in [64]’s formalism because x + x can encode
Double(x). However, its notation adds expressive power to [64]’s language because, for example, Dou-
ble(Double(Double(Double(x))) requires less memory space to encode than than x added to itself 16
times.
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language where all its quantifiers are bounded.) It is easy in this context to encode a
∆∗0 formulaMult(x, y, z) for representing multiplication’s graph. For instance, Equation
(45) is one such ∆∗0 formula (which actually does not employ any bounded quantifiers):
[ (x = 0 ∨ y = 0)⇒ z = 0 ] ∧ [ (x 6= 0 ∧ y 6= 0 ) ⇒ ( z
x
= y ∧ z − 1
x
< y ) ] (45)
Expression (45) is significant because Part 2 of Definition 3.4 indicated every generic
configuration must have available some method to represent the graphs of addition and
multiplication in a ∆ξ0 styled format, similar to (45)’s paradigm. (Addition can be treated
trivially because the U-grounding language possesses an addition function symbol.) The
footnote 21 serves as a reminder about why these ∆∗0 encodings are needed. Our next
goal is to define the generic configuration ξ∗ that Section D-2 will prove is EA-stable.
Definition D.1. The language L∗ of the generic configuration ξ∗will be built in
a natural manner out of the eight U-grounding function operations, the usual atomic
predicate symbols of “ = ” and “ ≤ ”, and the three constant symbols K0, K1 and
K2 (that define the integers of 0, 1 and 2). The other components of ξ
∗ ’s configuration
are defined below:
i As previously noted, ∆∗0 is defined to represent the set of all formulae in L
∗ ’s lan-
guage, whose quantifiers are bounded in an arbitrary manner by terms employing
the U-Grounding function symbols. (It will thus generate via Definition 3.1 the
Π∗n and Σ
∗
n sentences of L
∗ .)
ii The base axiom system B∗ for ξ∗ will be allowed to be any consistent set of Πξ
∗
1
sentences that is capable of proving every ∆∗0 sentence that is valid in Standard-
M. It will also include sentence (46)’s very precise 22 Π∗1 styled declaration that
addition is a total function.
∀x ∀y ∃ z ≤ x+ y : { z = x+ y } (46)
iii ξ∗ ’s deduction method will be the semantic tableaux method.
iv ξ∗ ’ s Go¨delized method g for encoding a semantic tableaux proof can be essentially
any natural method that satisfies the minor stipulation that at least 5J bits are
required to encode a semantic tableaux proof that has J function symbols. This
21Section 3 explained during its discussion of Lemma 3.6 that every generic configuration ξ must have
a means to encode the graphs of addition and multiplication as ∆ξ0 formulae (visavis Parts 1 and 2 of
Definition 3.4). This enabled Lemma 3.6’s procedure to translate all of conventional arithmetic’s Σj and
Πj formulae into equivalent Σ
ξ
j and Π
ξ
j expressions.
——————————————————-
22 The two appearances of the term “ x + y ” in sentence (46) may at first appear to be redundant.
(This statement is equivalent to sentence (4)’s declaration that addition is a total function, which had
avoided such redundancy.) The virtue of (46)’s format is that it is a Π∗1 styled statement, unlike (4)’s
Π∗2 styled format. This sharpened Π
∗
1 perspective will help simplify some of our proofs.
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stipulation is called the “Conventional Tableaux Encoding Requirement”.
It is trivial 23 to corroborate that all the usual methods for encoding semantic
tableaux proofs satisfy this criteria. (The Appendix A of [64] provides one example
of a possible tableaux encoding method. Any other natural mechanism for encoding
tableaux proofs is equally suitable.)
Section D-2 will, interestingly, prove that ξ∗ is EA-stable. This will imply (via
Theorem 5.9) that B∗ ∪ SelfCons1{ B∗ , d } is self-justifying. Theorems 6.6, 6.10,
G.2 and G.3 will, formalize, in this context, four different methods in which B∗ can be
extended to construct self-justifying formalisms that are able to prove Peano Arithmetic’s
Π∗1 theorems.
Thus while self-justifying axiom systems contain unavoidable weaknesses, they also
possess the nice feature that they are able to prove many of the useful theorems of
mathematics.
D-2. Proof of the EA-Stability of ξ∗
This section will prove ξ∗ is EA-stable and thus satisfies the paradigms of Theorems 5.9,
6.3, 6.6, 6.10 and 6.12. Our proof will be based on modifying some of the methodologies
from [64], so that they become applicable to ξ∗ . Many readers may prefer to omit ex-
amining both this part of Appendix D and Section D-3 because they are unnecessary for
understanding the material in Section 6 and Appendixes E and F. (Our recommendation
is that the latter material be read first.)
Our notation for defining a semantic tableaux proof in the next paragraph will be
similar to the conventional definitions appearing in Fitting’s and Smullyan’s textbooks
[12, 40]. It will employ [64]’s notation so that we can employ two of its lemmas during
our analysis of semantic tableaux proofs.
In our discussion, Φ will be called a Prenex-Level(m∗ ) sentence iff it is a Π∗m
or Σ∗m expression that satisfies the usual prenex requirement (that all its unbounded
quantifiers lie in its leftmost part). If Φ is Prenex-Level(m∗) then Reverse(Φ) shall
denote a second Prenex-Level(m∗ ) sentence that is equivalent to ¬ Φ rewritten 24 in
23The Conventional Tableaux Encoding Criteria requires that the Go¨del number of a semantic tableaux
proof, with J function symbols, must be least as large as 32J . It is clear that all the usual methods for
generating the Go¨del codes satisfy this criteria. This is because any proof that has J function symbols
will contain at least 2 J logical symbols and thus employ at least 5J bits.
——————————————————-
24For example, if Φ denotes “ ∀x ∃ y ψ(x, y) ” then Reverse(Φ) would be written as
“ ∃ x ∀ y ¬ ψ(x, y) ”.
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a Prenex Level(m∗ ) form. For a fixed axiom system α, its Φ-Based Candidate Tree
will be defined to be a tree structure whose root is the sentence Reverse(Φ) and whose
all other nodes are either axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes of the tree, via
the rules 1–8 given below. (The symbol “A =⇒ B ” in rules 1-8 will mean that B is
a valid deduction from its ancestor A in the germane deduction tree.)
1. Υ ∧ Γ =⇒ Υ and Υ ∧ Γ =⇒ Γ .
2. ¬¬Υ =⇒ Υ. Other rules for the “¬ ” symbol are: ¬(Υ ∨ Γ) =⇒ ¬Υ ∧ ¬Γ,
¬(Υ → Γ) =⇒ Υ ∧ ¬Γ , ¬(Υ ∧ Γ) =⇒ ¬Υ ∨ ¬Γ , ¬∃vΥ(v) =⇒ ∀v¬Υ(v)
and ¬∀vΥ(v) =⇒ ∃v¬Υ(v)
3. A pair of sibling nodes Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ ∨ Γ.
4. A pair of sibling nodes ¬Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ → Γ.
5. ∃vΥ(v) =⇒ Υ(u) where u is a newly introduced “Parameter Symbol”.
6. ∃v ≤ s Υ(v) =⇒ u ≤ s ∧ Υ(u) is the variation of Rule 5 for bounded
existential quantifiers of the form “ ∃v ≤ s ”.
7. ∀vΥ(v) =⇒ Υ(t) where t denotes a U-Grounded term. These terms may be
any one of a constant symbol, a parameter symbol (defined by a prior application
of Rules 5 or 6 to some some ancestor of the current node), or a U-Grounding
function-symbol with recursively defined inputs.
8. ∀v ≤ sΥ(v) =⇒ t ≤ s → Υ(t) is the variation of Rule 7 for a bounded quantifier
such as “ ∀v ≤ s ”
Let us say a leaf-to-root branch (in a candidate tree) is Closed iff it contains both some
sentence Υ and its negation “¬Υ”. Then a Semantic Tableaux Proof of Φ, from
the axiom system α, is defined to be a Φ-Based Candidate Tree whose every leaf-to-root
branch is closed.
It is next helpful to define the notion of a Z-Based Deduction Tree, in a context
where Z represents an axiom system, typically different from the prior paragraph’s α .
This object will be defined to be identical to a semantic tableaux proof, except for the
following changes:
i Every node in a Z−Based deduction tree must be either an axiom of Z or a deduction
from a higher node of the tree via the rules 1-8. (This applies also to the root of a
Z−Based deduction tree. It will store an axiom of Z in its root, unlike a semantic
tableaux proof which had stored Reverse(Φ) in its root.)
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ii There will be no requirement that each leaf-to-root branch be closed in a Z−Based
deduction tree. (Indeed, some branch will automatically not be closed if Z is
consistent.)
Items (i) and (ii) make it apparent that Z−Based deduction trees are different from
semantic tableaux proofs. It will turn out, nevertheless, that the study of Z−Based
deduction trees will clarify the nature of semantic tableaux proofs.
Definition D.2. Let a and b denote two integers that are powers of 2 satisfying
a > b ≥ 2 Then an axiom system Z (employing L∗ ’s language) will be called a
Normed(a,b) formalism iff:
1. All Z’s axioms are either Π∗1 or Σ
∗
1 sentences.
2. Each Π∗1 axiom of Z will satisfy Definition 4.3’s Good( Log2a ) criteria, and each
Σ∗1 axiom of Z will likewise satisfy Good( Log2b ).
Clarification about Definition D.2 : The “Normed(a,b)” concept (above)
is obviously equivalent to the same-named notion appearing in Definition 4 of [64].
It uses, however, a different notation to make it compatible with Section 4’s formal-
ism. Thus, Item 2’s assertion that the Π∗1 axiom ∀ v1 ∀ v2 ...∀vk φ(v1, v2, ...vk) satis-
fies Good( Log2a ) is equivalent to (47)’s statement. The Good(Log2b ) property of
∃ v1 ∃ v2 ...∃ vk φ(v1, v2, ...vk) is, likewise, equivalent to (48).
∀ v1 < a ∀ v2 < a ...∀ vk < a : φ(v1, v2, ...vk) . (47)
∃ v1 < b ∃ v2 < b ...∃ vk < b : φ(v1, v2, ...vk) . (48)
Our interests in this notation will center around Fact D.3’s invariant:
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Fact D.3 . Let ξ∗ denote Definition D.1’s generic configuration, and Z be an ex-
tension of ξ∗ ’s base axiom system B∗ which satisfies Definition D.2’s Normed(a, b) con-
straint. Then any Z−Based deduction tree T that has a Go¨del number smaller than
(a/b)4 must contain at least one root-to-leaf branch, called σ , that is not “closed”. (In
other words, this path σ will be contradiction-free, insofar as it does not contain both
some sentence Ψ and its formal negation).
Proof: The justification of Fact D.3 is a direct consequence of the Lemmas 1 and
2 appearing in article [64] (see footnote 25 for more details). ✷
25 A proof of Fact D.3 from first principles would be quite complicated because there are eight elimi-
nation rules employed by semantic tableaux deduction, each of which needs to be examined by such a
proof’s umbrella formalism. Fortunately, we do not need provide such a complicated analysis here be-
cause a 4-page proof of the Lemmas 1 and 2 in Section 5.2 of [64] had already visited these issues. Thus,
Fact D.3 turns out to be an easy consequence of these two lemmas after the following two straightforward
issues are addressed:
1. Section 5.2 of [64] had defined the “U-Height” of a deduction tree to be the largest number of
U-Grounding function symbols that appear in any of its root-to-leaf branches. Its Lemma 1 proved
that every deduction tree with a U-Height ≤ Log2a − Log2b will contain at least one branch
satisfying a condition, which [64] called “Positive(a,b)”. The Lemma 2 in [64] then showed that
this Positive(a,b) property implies that the germane deduction tree must contain some branch
that is contradiction-free. The combination of these two lemmas thus amounts to the establishing
of the following rephrased hybridized statement:
• If a Z-based deduction tree has a U-Height ≤ Log2a − Log2b , then some branch
of it is contradiction-free (i.e. this branch cannot contain both some sentence Ψ and
its negation).
2. Fact D.3 ’s hypothesis indicated the Go¨del number g for its deduction tree satisfied the following
conditions:
I. g ≤ (a/b)4
II. The U-Height of g ’s deduction tree is less than 1
5
Log2 g . (This is simply because Fact
D.3 presumes that the “Conventional Tableaux Encoding” methodology from Part-iv of
Definition D.1 was used to encode g’s Go¨del number.)
Items I and II imply g ’s tree has a U-Height ≤ Log2a − Log2b. The invariant • then implies
this deduction tree has at least one branch that is contradiction-free (as Fact D.3 claimed). ✷
We emphasize that the above justification of Fact D.3 is much simpler than a proof from first principles.
The latter would require examining eight different tableaux elimination rules, as the detailed proofs of
[64]’s Lemmas 1 and 2 actually did do.
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We will now apply Fact D.3 to prove Theorem D.4. Its invariant will, interestingly,
collapse entirely 26 if one were to merely add a multiplication function symbol to the U-
Grounding language. This is why our boundary-case exceptions to the semantic tableaux
version of the Second Incompleteness allow a Type-A axiom system to recognize addition
as a total function (but suppress a similar treatment of multiplication).
Theorem D.4. The generic configuration ξ∗ is both A-stable and E-stable. (This
implies many different self-justifying formalisms exist via Theorems 5.9, 6.3, 6.6, 6.10,
6.12, G.2 and G.3.)
Our proof of Theorem D.4 will separately show ξ∗ is A-stable and E-stable.
Proof of ξ∗ ’s A-stability : Suppose for the sake of establishing a proof by con-
tradiction that ξ∗ was not A-stable. Then the constraint ∗ of Definition 5.1 would be
violated by at least some θ ∈RE-Class(ξ). This violation will cause the statement +
to be true for such a θ :
+ There exists a semantic tableaux proof p of a Π∗1 theorem, called say Υ , from
the axiom system of θ ∪ Bξ such that Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 and where Υ also
fails to satisfy Good{ 12 ♯( θ) } .
Let us recall that if Υ is Π∗1 then Reverse(Υ ) is a Σ
∗
1 sentence equivalent to ¬Υ . Thus,
Reverse(Υ ) will satisfy Good{ 12 ♯( θ) } criteria (simply because it has the opposite
goodness property as Υ ). Also, if Z denotes the axiom system of θ∪Bξ+Reverse(Υ ),
it is easy to verify 27 that Z ’s axioms will satisfy the Normed{ 2 ♯( θ ) ,
√
2 ♯( θ ) } criteria.
It is next helpful to observe that what is a proof from one perspective corresponds
to being a deduction tree from a different perspective. Thus, Item + ’s proof p of the
26 The difficulty posed by multiplication can be easily understood when one compares two integers
sequences x0, x1, x2, ... and y0, y1, y2, ..., defined as follows:
xi = xi−1 + xi−1 AND yi = yi−1 ∗ yi−1
It turns out that the faster growth rate of multiplication under the series y0, y1, y2, ... enables one to
to construct tiny Z−Based deduction trees T that violate the analog of Fact D.3 ’s paradigm. (This is
because such trees can have Go¨del numbers smaller than (a/b)4 , while all their root-to-leaf branches can
be simultaneously “closed” via contradictions.) This property of multiplication is analogous to Example
3.7’s observations about how the differing growth rates of x0, x1, x2, ... and y0, y1, y2, ... are related to the
threshold where the semantic tableaux version of Second Incompleteness Theorem can be evaded.
——————————————————-
27 The axiom system Z must satisfy Normed{ 2 ♯( θ ) ,
√
2 ♯( θ ) } because:
1. The quantity 2 ♯( θ ) is a valid first component for Z’s norming constraint because all the axioms
of Bξ are true in the Standard-M model and because Definition 4.4 implies all of θ ’s axioms
satisfy Good { ♯( θ) }.
2. The quantity
√
2 ♯( θ ) is a valid second component for Z’s norming constraint because
Reverse(Υ ) is the only Σ∗1 sentence belonging to Z, and because Reverse(Υ ) satisfies
Good{ 1
2
♯( θ) } .
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theorem Υ from the axiom system of θ∪Bξ corresponds to being a Z-based deduction
tree, with Z representing the axiom system of θ ∪ Bξ+Reverse(Υ ). In this context,
Item + ’s inequality of Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ ) + 1 implies 28 that p , viewed as a deduction
tree for Z , satisfies the hypothesis of Fact D.3 . Hence, Fact D.3 establishes that p
must contain at least one contradiction-free root-to-leaf branch.
This last observation is all that is needed to confirm ξ∗ ’s A-stability, via a proof-by-
contradiction. This is because the definition of a semantic tableaux proof implies every
one of its root-to-leaf branches must end with a pair of contradicting nodes. However,
the last paragraph showed p will not satisfy this required property, if ξ∗ is not A-stable.
Hence our construction has proven the A-stability of ξ∗ by showing that otherwise an
infeasible circumstance will arise. ✷
Proof of ξ∗’s E-stability : A proof-by-contradiction will verify ξ∗ is E-stable,
analogous to the proof of its A-stability. Thus if ξ∗ was not E-stable, then statement
++ would be true for some θ. (This is because at least one θ ∈RE-Class(ξ) would then
violate Definition 5.3’s requirement of ∗ ∗ .)
++ There exists a semantic tableaux proof p of a Σξ1 theorem Υ from the axiom sys-
tem θ∪Bξ such that Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ)+1 and Υ also fails to satisfy Good{ 12 ♯( θ) }.
Item ++ implies Reverse(Υ) satisfies Good{ 12 ♯( θ)} (because Reverse(Υ) again has
the opposite goodness property as Υ ). Let Z now denote the formal axiom system of
θ∪Bξ+Reverse(Υ). The footnote 29 then uses reasoning similar to footnote 27 to show
Z satisfies Normed{
√
2 ♯( θ ) , 2 }
As before via a simple change in notation, p ’s semantic tableaux proof of Υ can be
viewed as a deduction tree using Z ’s axioms. Also as before, we may use the combination
of the facts that Z is a Normed{
√
2 ♯( θ ) , 2 } system and that Item ++ indicated
Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ)+1 to deduce30 that p is small enough to satisfy Fact D.3 ’s hypothesis.
28 Without loss of generality, we may assume that every non-trivial proof p satisfies Log(p) ≥ 64
(since a string with fewer than 64 bits is too short to be a proof). Then the footnoted paragraph’s
Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 inequality trivially implies p < 3 ♯( θ ) . In a context where Z is a
Normed{ 2 ♯( θ ) ,
√
2 ♯( θ ) } axiom system, the latter inequality certainly implies p , viewed as a
deduction tree for Z , has a small enough Go¨del number to satisfy the hypothesis for Fact D.3. (This is
because if one sets a = 2 ♯( θ ) and b =
√
2 ♯( θ ) then obviously p < 3 ♯( θ ) < 4 ♯( θ ) = (a/b)4 ).
——————————————————-
29The axiom system Z must satisfy Normed{
√
2 ♯( θ ) , 2 } because:
1. The first component of its norming constraint can be set equal to
√
2 ♯( θ ) because Reverse(Υ )
is a Good{ 1
2
♯( θ ) } Π∗1 sentence, and all Z ’s other Π∗1 sentences satisfy more relaxed
constraints.
2. The second component of Z’s norming constraint is satisfied by the constant of 2 because Definition
D.2 implies this quantity is always permissible when Z contains no Σ∗1 axiom sentences.
——————————————————-
30The proof that p is small enough to satisfy Fact D.3 ’s hypothesis in the current E-stable case is
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Hence once again, Fact D.3 implies that Z must contain at least one contradiction-free
root-to-leaf branch. As before, the existence of this contradiction-free path violates the
definition of a semantic tableaux proof and enables our proof-by-contradiction to reach
its desired end. ✷
Remark D.5 (about Theorem D.4’s significance) : Part-ii of Definition D.1 indicated
ξ∗ ’s base axiom of B∗ was a Type-A formalism that recognized addition as a total
function. This is significant because [60, 62, 67, 68] showed nearly all Type-M formalisms,
including all the common axiomatizations for IΣ0, are unable to recognize their semantic
tableaux consistency. Thus, the declaration that multiplication is a total function is the
trigger-point causing 31 the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem to become active. This threshold effect is significant because Theorem D.4,
combined with Theorems 6.6, 6.10, G.2 and G.3, formalize four different respects in
which Type-A self-justifying formalisms can prove all Peano Arithmetic’s Π∗1 theorems
( after multiplication’s totality axiom is suppressed).
D-3. Three Further Examples of Stable Generic Configurations
Our second example of an EA-stable configuration is called ξ∗∗ . It will be identical to
ξ∗ except that it will replace semantic tableaux with a stronger deduction method, which
[64] called Tab−U∗1 . The latter is a revised version of semantic tableaux that permits a
modus ponens rule to perform deductive cut operations on Π∗1 and Σ
∗
1 sentences. (The
formal definition of Tab−U∗1 deduction had appeared in [64]. It will be unnecessary to
repeat here.)
The Section 5.3 of [64] noted Tab−U∗1 has similar self-justification properties as
conventional semantic tableaux. All the results that Section D-2 proved about ξ∗ apply
also to ξ∗∗ , via their natural generalization under [64]’s Tab−U∗1 deduction method.
Thus, ξ∗∗ is also EA-stable.
A key point is that there is a non-trivial distinction between ξ∗ and ξ∗∗, despite the
fact that they have similar technical qualities. This is because ξ∗∗ contains a Level-1
modus ponens rule (unlike ξ∗ ). If it were infeasible to expand ξ∗ into a broader ξ∗∗,
then both formalisms could, perhaps, be easily dismissed as having negligible pragmatic
almost identical to Footnote 28’s analysis of the A-stable case. Thus as in the earlier case, Item ++’s
inequality of Log(p) ≤ ♯( θ) + 1 trivially implies p < 3 ♯( θ ) . Also, we may again assume that
Log(p) ≥ 64 (since a sequence with fewer than 64 bits cannot amount to a proof of any interesting
fact under all normal coding conventions). An analog of Footnote 28’s chain of inequalities will then
allow us to conclude that p is small enough proof from a Normed{
√
2 ♯( θ ) , 2 } system to satisfy the
hypothesis for Fact D.3.
——————————————————-
31We formally proved in [60, 62, 67, 68] that multiplication’s totality property causes the semantic
tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem to become active. The Example 3.7 summarizes
the main intuition behind these results.
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significance (since modus ponens is central to cogitation). However in a context where
ξ∗∗ does permit a Level-1 modus ponens rule, it is a tempting formalism (despite its
limited modus ponens rule).
Unlike ξ∗ and ξ∗∗ , our third example of an EA-stable configuration, called ξ− , will
support an unlimited modus ponens rule. This will be possible because ξ− ’s language
of L− will be weaker than the languages of ξ∗ and ξ∗∗ . Thus L− will include
the six Grounding functions, but not the Growth functions of addition and doubling. It
will thus treat addition and multiplication as 3-way atomic predicates, Add(x, y, z) and
Mult(x, y, z), rather than as formal functions.
This perspective enabled ξ− to support an evasion of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem with an unlimited modus ponens rule present, in a context where the other
four parts of its generic configuration are defined below:
1. The ∆−0 class for ξ
− will be built in an essentially natural manner from the
Grounding function set. It will thus include all formulae in L− ’s language, whose
quantifiers are bounded in any arbitrary manner using the Grounding function
primitives.
2. The base axiom system B− of ξ− will employ an infinite number of constant
symbols, denoted as K1,K2,K3, ... where K1 = 1 and where Ki+1 is a power of 2
defined by the axiom of:
Add( Ki , Ki , Ki+1 ) (49)
Thus, the combination of K1,K2,K3, ... with the Grounding function of subtrac-
tion allows the language L− to encode the value of any arbitrary natural number
(as Part 1 of Definition 3.4 had required). Essentially, ξ− ’s base axiom system of
B− can be any consistent r.e. set of Π−1 sentences that includes (49)’s axiom
schema and is able to prove every ∆−0 sentence which is valid in the Standard-M
model.
3. ξ− ’s deduction method can be any version of a classic Hilbert-style proof method-
ology. (Thus, it will include a modus ponens rule with no restrictions.)
4. ξ− ’s Go¨delization method can be essentially any natural technique.
An interesting aspect of ξ− is it can be proven to be EA-stable via an analog of Section
D-2’s treatment of ξ∗. Thus, Theorem 6.6 implies every axiom system α, whose Π−1
theorems hold true in the Standard-M model, can be mapped onto an extension of ξ− ’s
base axiom system that can recognize its own Hilbert consistency and prove α’s Π−1
theorems. Except for minor changes in notation, this result represents a new way of
proving [66]’s Theorem3.
46
The self-justifying features of ξ∗, ξ∗∗ and ξ− are of interest primarily because the
Second Incompleteness Theorem implies that they cannot be improved much further.
This tight fit is summarized by Items 1-4.
1. The Theorem 2.1 (due to the combined work of Nelson, Pudla´k, Solovay andWilkie-
Paris [26, 33, 44, 58] ) implies no natural axiom system can prove Successor is a total
function and recognize its own Hilbert consistency. This theorem thus explains why
the presence of growth functions must be omitted from ξ− ’s base axiom system of
B−.
2. Moreover, [66] proved ξ− ’s method for evading the Second Incompleteness Theo-
rem will collapse if one replaces Equation (49)’s “addition-based named sequence”
of constant symbols K1,K2,K3, ... with a faster growing “multiplicative conven-
tion”, where the constant symbols C1, C2, C3, ... are formally defined via (50)’s
schema.
Mult( Ci , Ci , Ci+1 ) (50)
Thus, [66] showed that there exists a Π−1 sentence W (provable from Peano Arith-
metic) such that no consistent system can simultaneously prove W , contain (50)’s
axiom schema and prove the non-existence of proof of 0 = 1 from itself. There
is no space to prove it here, but a generalization of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem implies the modification of ξ− that replaces (49)’s axiom schema with
(50)’s schema is not even 0-stable.
3. Similarly, [62, 67] proved that if ξ∗ ’s and ξ∗∗ ’s base axiom system of B∗ was
strengthened to include the assumption that multiplication was a total function
then [64]’s two semantic tableaux evasions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
would both collapse.
4. Also, [63] proved that an analog of ξ∗∗ ’s evasion of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem will collapse if its modus ponens rule was expanded to apply to either Π∗2
or Σ∗2 sentences.
The Item 3 is especially interesting because [65] proved [64]’s evasion of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem was compatible with its formalism recognizing an infinitized
generalization of a computer’s floating point multiplication as a total function. Thus
while the semantic tableaux formalisms of ξ∗ or ξ∗∗ are provably unable [62, 67] to
recognize integer multiplication as a total function, their relationship to floating point
multiplication is more subtle.
Our fourth example of an application of Section 6’s theorems was stimulated by some
insightful email we received from L. A. Ko lodziejczyk [20] in 2005. It noted there existed
a potential exponential gap between the lengths of semantic tableaux and Herbrand-style
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proofs under some circumstances. Our earlier research [62] addressed a 1981 Paris-Wilkie
open question [30] by generalizing some Adamowicz-Zbierski techniques [1, 3] to show
a natural axiomatization of IΣ0 satisfied the semantic tableaux version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem. In this context, Ko lodziejczyk asked whether this would apply
to all plausible axiomatizations for IΣ0 ?
We replied in [68] to Ko lodziejczyk’s stimulating question by distinguishing between
Example 3.2’s ∆A0 and ∆
R
0 formulae and by using the Paris-Dimitracopoulos [28] transla-
tion algorithm for ∆0 formulae. (The latter procedure was summarized earlier by Lemma
3.6. It demonstrated how to map classic arithmetic’s ∆A0 formulae onto equivalent ∆
R
0
formulae in the Standard-M model.) Our reply to Ko lodziejczyk’s question, thus, em-
ployed this translation methodology to show that there existed an axiom system, called
Ax-3, which proved the identical set of theorems as the more common Ax-1 and Ax-2
encodings of IΣ0 and which possessed the following pair of quite fascinating contrasting
properties:
A No consistent superset β of Ax-3’s set of axioms is capable of proving its own
semantic tableaux consistency [68].
B In contrast, if “Herb” denotes the next paragraph’s Herbrand-styled deduction and
if “SelfRef” denotes the sentence • from Section 1, then Ax3+SelfRef(Ax-3,Herb)
will be a self-justifying axiom system.
The intuition behind [68]’s proof of Items A and B can be easily summarized if we
define a “Herbrandized-style” proof of a theorem Φ from an axiom system α as being
an essentially 2-part structure where:
1. Each of α’s axioms and also the sentence ¬Φ are first written as Skolemized
expressions.
2. A propositional calculus proof is then used to show that some formal conjunction
of instances of Item 1’s Skolemization schema has no satisfying truth assignment.
Such a formalism is different from the definition of a semantic tableaux proof (appearing
in for example Fitting’s textbook [12] ). This is because the latter replaces the use of
Skolemization in Items 1 and 2 with an existential quantifier elimination rule. It turns
out that this distinction enables some semantic tableaux proofs to be exponentially more
compressed than their Herbrandized counterparts, as Ko lodziejczyk observed [20, 21].
This fact enabled [68] to prove that Herbrandized and semantic tableaux proofs have the
divergent properties summarized by Items A and B.
One reason Ax-3’s evasion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem is of interest is
that IΣ0 supports many more generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
than evasions of it. Thus, Willard [62, 67, 68] proved that the semantic tableaux version
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of the Second Incompleteness Theorem was valid for three different encodings of IΣ0,
and Adamowicz, Salehi and Zbierski have discussed in great detail [1, 3, 37] various
Herbrandized generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for particular en-
codings of IΣ0 and IΣ0+Ωi. Moreover, an added facet of [68]’s Ax-3 encoding for IΣ0 is
that most automated theorem provers use a particular variant of the Resolution method
that causes [68]’s unusual methodology to apply also to them 32.
The reason for our interest in [68]’s results is that it represents a fourth example where
the meta-theorems from Sections 5 and 6 can be useful. Thus, the footnote 33 summarizes
how a fourth type of generic configuration, called ξR , can be defined that both duplicates
[68]’s main self-justification results under the above definition of Herb-deduction, as well
as strengthens them. (In particular, ξR meets Theorem 5.11’s requirements, and self-
justifying extensions of its Ax-3 system thus recognize their Level(0R) consistency.)
The properties of our four generic configurations of ξR, ξ∗ , ξ∗∗ and ξ− are
summarized by Table I. These configurations are listed in ascending order according to
the strength of their deduction methods d . As their deduction methods increase in
strength, these configurations have their ability reduced to recognize the totality of the
addition and multiplication operations.
ξR is thus a Type Almost-M system that can prove multiplication is a total function
(but which does not contain Equation (5)’s totality statement as an axiom). On the other
hand, ξ− uses a stronger Hilbert-styled deduction methodology, which is incompatible
with treating the totality of addition or multiplication as either axioms or as derived
theorems.
32The main theorems in [68] generalize for resolution because Resolution-based theorem provers employ
skolemization analogously to Herbrand deduction.
——————————————————-
33The discussion in [68] did not technically use Definition 5.3’s machinery to establish there existed
an extension of its “Ax-3” encoding for IΣ0 that could recognize its own Herbrand consistency. Its
formalism, however, could be easily couched in terms of Definition 5.3’s machinery, if one uses a generic
configuration ξR where
1. ξR ’s base language is the same as the usual language of arithmetic,
2. ξR ’s ∆R0 sub-class is defined by Item (b) in Example 3.2,
3. ξR ’s base axiom system is [68]’s “Ax-3” system,
4. ξR ’s deduction method is either a Herbrandized styled-method or a Resolution system that relies
upon Skolemizatin in a similar manner.
5. ξR ’s Go¨del encoding scheme may be any such natural method.
This approach supports a stronger form of self-justification result than had appeared in [68]. This is
because ξR can be proven to be E-stable (by a generalization of [68]’s analysis techniques). Thus,
Theorem 5.11 implies that Ax-3 has a well-defined self-justifying extension that can recognizes its own
formalized Level(0R) consistency. (This self-justification result is stronger than [68]’s main theorem. The
latter merely established that some extension of Ax-3 recognized the non-existence of a Herbrandized
deduction of 0 = 1 from itself.)
——————————————————-
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Each of Table I’s rows ξR, ξ∗∗ and ξ− are maximal (in that an alternate row
improves upon one column’s measurement only when it is weaker from the perspective
of another column). Only ξ∗ is an exception to this rule: It is strictly weaker 34 than
ξ∗∗. This appendix has discussed ξ∗ because it makes Theorem D.4’s proof simpler (and
also because semantic tableaux is a frequent topic in the logic literature).
Table I
Name Deduction Method Type Almost Type Axiom Self-Just
A M M Format Level
Resolution and/or
ξR Herbrandized analogs Yes35 Yes No E-stable Level (0R)
ξ∗ Semantic Tableaux Yes No No EA-stable Level (1∗)
ξ∗∗ Tab−U∗1 Deduction 34 Yes No No EA-stable Level (1∗)
ξ− Hilbert Deduction No No No EA-stable Level (∞− )
The footnote 35 , attached to Table I’s first row, explains why a caveat is attached
to its first “Yes” entry. The theme of Table I is that self-justifying axiom systems have
some nice redeeming features, although the Second Incompleteness Theorem clearly also
imposes severe limits on their abilities. This point will be reinforced when Appendix E
introduces a generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, that shows Theorem
6.12’s translational reflection principle is close to being a maximal feasible result, and
when Appendix F discusses the epistemological significance of self justification.
34 ξ∗∗ employs a stronger deduction method than ξ∗ because it allows a modus ponens rule for Π∗1
and Σ∗1 sentences to be added to semantic tableaux deduction (see [64] for the precise definition of this
“Tab−U∗1 ” modification of the semantic tableaux deductive method).
——————————————————-
35For the sake of simplicity, the Ax-3 system of [68] did not use either Equations (2) or (4)’s as
axiom statements (since they were provable as theorems). All [68]’s results do, however, generalize when
(2)’s statement about addition’s totality is included as an axiom. Thus, it is appropriate to attach the
designation of “Yes” with a caveat to the “Type-A” entry in Table I’s first row. (This row is called
“Resolution and/or Herbrandized analogs” because it applies to essentially any deduction scheme that
relies upon Skolemization as an alternative to [12]’s semantic tableaux existential quantifier elimination
rule.)
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Appendix E: A Clarification of Theorem 6.12’s Significance
It has been known since the time of Go¨del that most conventional arithmetic axiom
systems will satisfy the following two invariants:
1. They are physically unable to prove their own consistency
2. They are Σ1 complete. This means they can formally prove any Σ1 arithmetic
sentence that holds true in the Standard-M model, and they can likewise refute
any Πξ1 sentence that is false.
Let ξ denote any generic configuration of the form (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G). This appendix
will use the term ξ−Conventional to describe any axiom system that satisfies analogs
of the preceding conditions for generic configurations. Thus α is ξ−Conventional iff it
satisfies the following two criteria:
a. The axiom system α will be unable to verify its own consistency under ξ ’s
deduction method of d .
b. The axiom system α will be an extension of ξ ’s base axiom of Bξ . Part-3 of
Definition 3.4 will thus imply it is Σξ1 complete. (Hence, α can formally prove any
Σξ1 sentence that holds true in the Standard-M model, and it can likewise refute
any Πξ1 sentence that is false.)
This section will prove no analog of Equation (34)’s translational reflection principle
is feasible for ξ−Conventional axiom systems. Thus, Theorem 6.12 must be close to
being a maximal result, since it cannot plausibly be further extended to hold under
conventional axiom systems.
Theorem E.1 (A New Type of Version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem):
There exists no ξ−Conventional axiom system α that can prove the validity of (51)’s
Translational Reflection Principle for any translation-mapping T. (In other words, there
exists no algorithm T that maps Πξ1 sentences Ψ onto alternate Π
ξ
1 sentences Ψ
T ,
which are equivalent to Ψ in the Standard-M model and where α can verify (51)’s
reflection principle for every Πξ1 sentence Ψ. )
∀ p [ Prfα,d( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , p ) ⇒ ΨT ] (51)
Proof: It is easy to prove Theorem E.1 via a proof-by-contradiction. Thus consider
the possibility that Theorem E.1’s translational mapping T did exist. One can then
easily select a Πξ1 sentences Ψ that is false in the Standard-M model. Then Ψ
T is also
false under the Standard-M model (since Ψ and ΨT are equivalent in this model).
Hence Part-b of the definition of ξ−Conventionality implies α must prove ¬ ΨT
(on account of ΨT ’s Πξ1 format).
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It is at this juncture that our proof-by-contradiction will reach its end. This is
because if α can prove (51)’s statement and also prove the sentence ¬ ΨT , then it
certainly can combine these two facts to prove the non-existence of a proof of Ψ . The
latter contradicts Part-a of the definition of ξ−Conventionality (because it shows α can
verify its own consistency). ✷
Remark E.2. We remind the reader that Footnote 14 pointed out that T ’s transla-
tional mapping would lose its main functionality, if it did not require ΨT to have a Πξ1
format, similar to Ψ. In essence, Theorem E.1 is of interest because it shows that The-
orem 6.12’s evasion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem is close to being a maximal
result. (It thus shows that (51)’s translational reflection principle does not generalize
to conventional axiom systems.) This dichotomy may explain why self-justifying axiom
systems, along with Theorem 6.12’s particular invariant, are potentially useful results.
Appendix F: Epistemological Perspective and Speculations
It is desirable to include a short purely epistemological discussion within this mostly
mathematical article so that the more subtle nature of our results cannot be miscon-
strued.
Part of the reason Self Justification can lend itself to easy misinterpretations is that
the First Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates the impossibility of constructing an
ideally optimal axiomatization of number theory. For any initial r.e. axiom system α
and deduction method d, Go¨del thus noted it is easy 36 to develop an extension of α
that can prove strictly more theorems than α under d’s deduction method. Moreover,
a large number of generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, starting with
its 1939 Hilbert-Bernays version [16], are known to be robust results.
Such considerations naturally lead to questions about whether any r.e. axiom system
can encompass the workings of the human mind. It may surprise some readers to learn
that this author shares such skepticism. That is, we doubt any single ISOLATED self-
justifying r.e. logic can fully approximate the complex workings of the human mind.
In this short appendix, let us instead view cogitation as roughly a process won-
dering though some universe U , comprised of both consistent and inconsistent axiom
systems, with a trial-and-error evolutionary method focusing its attention over time in-
creasingly onto the members of this universe U that are found to be consistent. It is
straightforward37 to define many universes U and evolutionary processes that fall into
36Let ✵(a, d) the classic Go¨del sentence that asserts: “There is no proof of this sentence from α’s
axiom system under d’s deduction method.” Go¨del [14] noted α+✵(α, d) always proves more theorems
than α.
37It is trivial from a theoretical perspective to design a learning heuristic that will utilize all consistent
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this gendre. Our goal in this section will be to examine Section 5’s “R-View” θ and its
RE-Class(ξ).
Thus, θ will denote an R-View that consists of an arbitrary r.e. set of Πξ1 sentences.
Also, RE-Class(ξ) will again denote the set of all θ which can be built under ξ ’s
language of Lξ. (Section 5 had allowed both valid and invalid R-Views θ to appear
in RE-Class(ξ) because no recursive decision procedure can identify all the Standard-M
model’s true Πξ1 sentences.)
The epistemological purpose of this notation was revealed in Section 6. For the cases
where k = 0 or 1, Section 6 defined Gξk( θ ) to be the axiom system:
Gξk( θ ) = θ ∪ Bξ ∪ SelfConsk{ [ θ ∪ Bξ ] , d } (52)
Also, Definition 6.2 indicated that the function Gξk (which maps θ onto G
ξ
k( θ ) ) would
be called Consistency Preserving iff Gξk( θ ) is assured to be consistent whenever all
the sentences in θ are true under the Standard-M model. Theorem 6.3 indicated, in
this context, that Gξ1 satisfies this property whenever ξ is EA-stable. Likewise, G
ξ
0
is consistency preserving whenever ξ is one of A-stable, E-stable or 0-stable.
These results indicate a trial-and-error experimental process can, indeed, walk in an
unusually orderly manner through an universe of self-reflecting candidate formalisms,
when RE-Class(ξ) denotes U ’s universe and ξ satisfies any of the EA-stable, E-stable,
A-stable or 0-stable conditions. This is because if θ designates a set of Πξ1 sentences
holding true in the Standard-M model, then Gξk(θ) will automatically satisfy both
Parts (i) and (ii) of Section 1’s definition of Self Justification, according to Theorem 6.3.
Such consistency preservation is surprising because it is simply inapplicable to the Gξk
functions for most pairs (ξ, k). Theorem 6.3’s first contribution is, thus, that it formalizes
how Gξk ’s mapping function can represent a type of approximation for instinctive faith,
under certain well-defined circumstances.
This notion of instinctive faith is, of course, less robust than a conventional proof.
One obvious difficulty is that a 1-sentence proof, using an “I am consistent” axiom, is
less convincing than a full-length proof from first principles. Also, if the initial formalism
θ contains a false Πξ1 sentence then B
ξ + θ and Gξk(θ) will be both inconsistent.
axiom systems from its available universe U eventually, and it will spend only an infinitesimal fraction
of its effort on inconsistent systems as time runs to infinity. (This because there exists only a countable
number of distinct r.e. sets belonging to the universe U . ) Also, this learning process can presumably be
made to employ some type of smart souped-up AI heuristics to enhance its efficiency, whose details will
not concern us in this abbreviated 3-page appendix. What is central to the current discussion is that
some type of formally non-recursive and presumably trial-and-error method must obviously be used by
this learning process to find the consistent elements of U , on account of Go¨del’s undecidability results.
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Nevertheless for k equals 0 or 1, if θ is comprised of the true sentences in the
Standard-M model, then Theorem 6.3 will assure that Gξk(θ) is a consistent system
that has an ability to use its “I am consistent” axiom sentence to formalize its own
consistency. Moreover, the axiom system Gξk(θ) is helpful because Go¨del’s famous
centennial paper implicitly raised the following bedeviling issue:
# How is it that Human Beings manage to muster the physical drive to
think (and prove theorems) when the many generalizations of Go¨del’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem demonstrate conventional logics lack knowledge of
their own consistency?
While philosophical paradoxes and ironical dilemmas, similar to # , never yield per-
fect answers, the preceding discussion is helpful because it explores a certain syllogism
whereby a logic can formalize at least some fragmented operational appreciation of its
own consistency.
Moreover, Part-3 of Appendix D indicated that its four self-justifying configurations
were close to being maximal results that cannot be much improved, on account of various
barriers imposed by the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Thus, these particular positive
results, combined with Theorems 5.9 6.3, 6.6, 6.10, 6.12, D.4, E.1, G.2, G.3 and Remarks
6.4 and 6.16, come close to formalizing the maximal variants of instinctive faith that a
first-order logic can bolster.
The theme of the last two paragraphs is thus that our approximation of “instinctive
faith” may be imperfect, but it is still a useful partial reply to # ’s puzzling dilemma
in a context where unambiguous full resolutions to # are not permitted by the Second
Incompleteness Theorem. Furthermore, Equation (34)’s translational reflection principle,
together with Theorem 6.12 and the Remarks 6.13 and 6.14, illustrate how the notion
of an instinctive faith about the usefulness of Πξ1 theorems can be almost physically
hard-wired into self-justifying formalisms.
A Yet Further Facet of this Unusual Epistemological Interpretation: Let
the term Epistemological Bundle Theory refer to the underlying theory, advanced in
this appendix, which speculates about a Thinking Agent walking through RE-Class(ξ)’s
bundled universe of valid and invalid collections of Πξ1 sentences and then applying some
heuristic to attempt to identify those θ ∈RE-Class(ξ) whose sentences are true under
the Standard-M model.
Such a theory has a second virtue, aside from addressing # ’s paradoxical question
about the nature of “instinctive faith”. It also clarifies the meaning of our main theorems
and the related E-stability, A-stability, EA-stability and RE-Class(ξ) constructs.
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This is because the Items ∗ and ∗∗ from the definitions of A-stability and E-stability
in Section 5 formalize how a thinking agent T can view short proofs from a technically
inconsistent axiom system of Bξ ∪ θ as containing pragmatically useful information
under the assumption that the lengths of T ’s proofs are shorter than the errors in
θ ’s Πξ1 styled-statements. The pleasing aspect about this observation, illustrated by
Remark 5.2, is that those same invariants, ∗ and ∗∗ , which tempt a thinking agent T
to engage in a trial-and-error walk through RE-Class(ξ)’s bundled universe, also make
viable Theorem 5.9’s self-justifying formalisms.
Thus aside from addressing # ’s dilemma about the nature of instinctive faith, the
meta-formalism in this appendix is useful in explaining the motivation behind the elab-
orate network of theorems, proofs and definitions that were introduced in this paper.
In summary, EA-stable logics are thus interesting both in their own right (as a vehicle
enabling a Thinking Being to partially tolerate its own errors), and because they are
useful in explaining how a Thinking Being can possess a type of instinctive faith in its
own consistency (via the reflection principles of Theorem 6.12 and of Remarks 6.13 and
6.14).
Appendix G: Improvements upon Theorems 6.6 and 6.10
Let us recall that Remark 6.11 indicated that there was a subtle trade-off between
Theorems 6.6 and 6.10, where neither result was strictly better than the other. This
section will introduce two hybrid methodologies, using Definition G.1’s formalism, that
improve upon Theorem 6.10 while retaining a large part of Theorem 6.6’s nice features.
Definition G.1 Let ξ denote the generic configuration, whose base axiom system
is again denoted as Bξ , Φ denote any Πξ1 sentence that is true in the Standard-M
model and j denote an index that represents some predicate Testξj lying in Definition
6.8’s TestListξ sequence. Then a Πξ1 sentences Ψ will be said to be a Braced
ξ(Φ , j )
expression when Bξ + Φ can prove:
{ ∀ x Testξj( ⌈ Ψ ⌉ , x ) } −→ Ψ (53)
Theorem G.2 Let ξ again denote an arbitrary generic configuration (Lξ,∆ξ0, B
ξ, d,G),
and let (B,D) again denote any second axiom system and deduction method whose Πξ1
theorems are true under the Standard-M model. Then for any integer j and for any Πξ1
sentence Φ that is true in the Standard-M model, the following invariants do hold:
i If ξ is EA-stable then there will exist a self-justifying βj ⊃ Bξ that can recognize its
Level(1ξ) consistency, contains only a finite number of additional axioms beyond
those appearing in Bξ, and which can prove all of (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems that are
Bracedξ(Φ, j) expressions.
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ii Likewise, if ξ is E-stable, A-stable or 0-stable then a self-justifying βj ⊃ Bξ will exist
with the same properties except that it recognizes its own Level(0ξ) consistency.
Proof. To justify Theorem G.2, we must first define the axiom system βj , whose
existence is claimed by Items (i) and (ii). It will be defined to consist of the union of the
initial base axiom system Bξ with the following three added axiom-sentences.
1 The Πξ1 sentence Φ used by Definition G.1’s Braced
ξ(Φ, j) formula.
2 A GlobSimD
B
(ξ, j) sentence whose indexing integer j is defined by Definition G.1.
This global simulation sentence is thus the statement:
∀ t ∀ q ∀ x { [ PrfDB (t, q) ∧ Checkξ(t) ] −→ Testξj(t, x) } (54)
3 A Πξ1 sentence of the form SelfCons
k{ [ θ ∪ Bξ ] , d } where:
a θ is an R-view consisting of the two Πξ1 sentences defined by Items 1 and 2.
b Bξ is ξ ’s base axiom system, and
c k equals respectively 1 and 0 under formalisms (i) and (ii).
Thus, the system βj uses identical definitions under formalisms (i) and (ii), except that
its third sentence will use a different value for k . Our proof of Theorem G.2 will require
first confirming the following fact:
Claim * The axiom system βj (which consists of the union of B
ξ with the sentences
1-3) will have a capacity to prove every Bracedξ(Φ, j) sentence Ψ that is a Πξ1
theorem of (B,D).
The proof of Claim * is quite simple. It will rest on the following three observations:
a For each Πξ1 sentence Ψ, the system βj must certainly have a capacity to prove
(55)’s sentence (which states that Ψ ’s Go¨del number formally encodes a Πξ1 state-
ment). This is because (55) is true in the Standard-M model and because Part 3
of Definition 3.4 indicated that the Bξ sub-component of βj has a capacity to
prove every ∆ξ0 sentence that is true.
Checkξ( ⌈Ψ ⌉ ) (55)
b Since Claim ∗ specifies Ψ is a theorem of (B,D), there must certainly exist some
integer N that is the Go¨del number of its proof from (B,D). This implies that
(56) must be a true ∆ξ0 sentence under the Standard-M model. As was the case
with Equation (55), this implies that it must be provable from Bξ (because it is
a valid ∆ξ0 sentence).
PrfDB ( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , N ) (56)
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c It is apparent that Equations (54), (55) and (56) imply the validity of (57). Moreover,
Part 4 of Definition 3.4 indicated that the generic configuration ξ ’s deduction
method does satisfy Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem. This fact assures that βj
must be able to prove (57) because it contains (54) as an axiom and (55) and (56)
as derived theorems 38.
∀ x Testξj( ⌈Ψ ⌉ , x ) (57)
Claim ∗ is a consequence of Observations a-c. This is because Φ is one of βj ’s defined
axioms, and Definition G.1 indicated Bξ + Φ was capable of proving (53)’s statement
for every Bracedξ(Φ, j) sentence Ψ . These facts corroborate Claim ∗ because they imply
that βj must be able to verify Claim ∗ ’s sentence Ψ (because βj can verify statements
(53) and (57)).
The remainder of Theorem G.2’s proof is analogous to Theorem 6.10’s proof. This is
because the prior paragraph established that βj can prove every Braced
ξ(Φ, j) theorem
of (B,D) (as was required by Claims i and ii ). The only remaining task is to show
that βj is a self-justifying formalism that can recognize its Level(1
ξ) and Level(0ξ)
consistencies, as specified by Claims i and ii. This part of Theorem G.2’s verification
is identical to the methods used to prove Theorems 6.3 and 6.10. It will thus not be
repeated here. ✷
The last part of this appendix will require the following additional notation to for-
malize the main intended application of Theorem G.2’s formalism.
1. Count(Ψ) will denote the number of quantifiers appearing in the sentence Ψ (in-
cluding both its bounded and unbounded quantifiers).
2. Sizeξ(c) will denote the set of Πξ1 sentences Ψ where Count(Ψ) ≤ c .
Our next theorem will be a specialized variant of Theorem G.2, using the Sizeξ(c) con-
struct. It will explain the intended application of this formalism:
Theorem G.3. Let ξ denote any one of Appendix D’s four sample generic
configurations of ξ∗ , ξ∗∗ , ξ− or ξR . Then for any c > 0 , Theorem G.2’s axiom
systems of βj can be arranged so that they can prove all of (B,D)’s Sizeξ(c) Πξ1 theorems
while simultaneously also recognizing their:
1. Level(1) consistency for the cases when ξ is one of ξ∗ , ξ∗∗ or ξ−.
2. Level(0) consistency when ξ is ξR .
38 Every deduction method d, satisfying Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem, will be automatically able
to prove a theorem Z when it contains X, Y and (X∧Y ) → Z as theorems, irregardless of whether or
not it contains an explicit built-in modus ponens rule. Thus d can prove (57) because of its knowledge
about (54)–(56)’s validity.
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Proof Sketch: The intuition behind Theorem G.3’s proof is quite easy to summarize.
For arbitrary c > 0 and any of Appendix D’s configurations of ξ∗ , ξ∗∗ , ξ− and ξR ,
it is routine to construct an ordered pair (Φ, j) where every Πξ1 sentence of Size
ξ(c) is
a Bracedξ(Φ, j) expression. Theorem G.3’s first claim is, thus, a consequence of Part (i)
of Theorem G.2 and the fact that each of ξ∗ , ξ∗∗ and ξ− are EA-stable. Likewise,
Theorem G.3’s second claim follows from Part (ii) of Theorem G.2 and the fact that ξR
is E-stable, ✷
Remark G.4. The Theorems G.2 and G.3 are of interest because the set of Πξ1
sentences of Sizeξ(c) is a natural class to examine. It is, thus, tempting to consider a
system that recognizes its own formal consistency, uses only a finite number of axiom
sentences beyond those in Bξ , and which can prove all of (B,D)’s Πξ1 theorems of
Sizeξ(c). Such a system replies to Remark 6.11’s challenge by hybridizing the properties
of Theorems 6.6 and 6.10, in a seemingly pragmatic manner.
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